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Mind the Gap: Bridging Gender Wage Inequality in 
Louisiana 
INTRODUCTION 
The public policy of Louisiana is that “a woman who performs public 
service for the state is entitled to be paid the same compensation for her 
services as is paid to a man who performs the same kind, grade, and quality 
of service, and a distinction in compensation may not be made because of 
sex.”1 Strikingly, Louisiana women who are not in public service are not 
entitled to the same protections.2 President Bill Clinton has acknowledged, 
“[y]ou wouldn’t tolerate getting to vote in three out of every four elections. 
You wouldn’t like it if someone said you could only pick up three out of 
every four paychecks. But that is, in effect, what we have said to the 
women of America.”3 This statement is even more applicable in Louisiana, 
where the wage gap is nearly 14% higher than the national average.4  
Scholars in the field have recognized that federal gender wage equality 
provisions are dying out from various “ailments,” including “inefficiencies, 
excessive costs, bureaucratic red tape, and obsolescence.”5 A legislative 
measure aimed at fixing these ailments could do much to aid all Louisiana 
workers and to bridge the gender wage gap that has plagued Louisiana for 
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 1. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:662 (2016) (emphasis added).  
 2. See generally id. §§ 23:662, 23:332. 
 3. President William J. Clinton, Remarks on The Equal Pay Act (June 10, 1998). 
 4. At the time of President Clinton’s speech, the national gender wage gap 
meant women earned 73.2 cents on the male dollar, the equivalent of approximately 
three out of every four paychecks a man received. The Wage Gap Over Time, NAT’L 
WOMEN’S L. CTR., http://nwlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/wage_gap_over 
_time_overall_9.21.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/YC5S-LRJX] (last visited Oct. 13, 
2016). Louisiana’s gender wage gap for 2014 was 65 cents, meaning women in 
Louisiana would receive fewer than two out of every three paychecks a man in 
Louisiana receives. AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, THE SIMPLE TRUTH ABOUT THE 
GENDER PAY GAP 7 (2015) [hereinafter THE SIMPLE TRUTH]. This Comment was 
written before the most current version of The Simple Truth was released. The most 
current version can be accessed here: http://www.aauw.org/aauw_check/pdf_down 
load/show_pdf.php?file=The-Simple-Truth [https://perma.cc/TN6P-ZPA2].   
 5. Andrew Brenton, Comment, Overcoming the Equal Pay Act and Title VII: 
Why Federal Sex-Based Employment Discrimination Laws Should Replaced with a 
System for Accrediting Employers for Their Antidiscriminatory Employment Practice, 
26 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 349, 350 (2011). 




decades.6 The gender wage gap7 in Louisiana in 2014 was 35% and has been 
increasing in the last few years.8 This statistic makes Louisiana last in the 
nation, where women make an average of 65 cents on the male dollar.9 
Nationally, women make an average of 79 cents on the male dollar, a wage 
gap of 21%.10  
Historically, the gender wage gap has been explained away by several 
factors, including education, occupational segregation, childbearing, 
childrearing, and labor force participation.11 As these factors have become 
less prevalent over time,12 many have realized that a portion of the gender 
wage gap still cannot be explained and is attributable to gender wage 
discrimination.13  
Currently, a woman in Louisiana has several methods to claim wage 
discrimination, including filing a claim under federal or state law.14 
However, these laws are insufficient and do not offer adequate protections 
to employees, specifically because Louisiana operates under two equal pay 
regimes, thus affording better protections to one group of working women 
over others.15 Louisiana employees need a new statutory regime that is 
efficient, clear, and gives all employees equal rights and protections 
regardless of gender or employer. This regime should provide protection to 
both public and private employees in Louisiana. Therefore, the Louisiana 
Legislature should modify and pass Senate Bill 219, which failed during the 
2015 Regular Legislative Session.16 
Part I of this Comment provides background on the history of the 
gender wage gap in the United States and in Louisiana, as well as historical 
explanations and justifications for the existence of the gap. Part II and Part 
                                                                                                             
 6. See generally Hearing on S.B 219 Before the H. Comm. on Labor & 
Indus. Relations, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2015). 
 7. The gender wage gap is the difference in the annual wages received by 
men and women, often for similar work. THE SIMPLE TRUTH, supra note 4, at 5. 
 8. Id. at 7. 
 9. Id.  
 10. Id. 
 11. Marianne DelPo Kulow, Beyond the Paycheck Fairness Act: Mandatory 
Wage Disclosure Laws—A Necessary Tool For Closing the Residual Gender 
Wage Gap, 50 HARV. J. LEGIS. 385, 393 (2013). 
 12. See discussion infra Part I.A.1–6. 
 13. Kulow, supra note 11, at 393.  
 14. See Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012); Title VII, Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012); Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e (2012); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2012); 29 
U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012); LA. REV. STAT. §§ 23:303, 23:332, 23:665 (2016). 
 15. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 23:662, 23:332. 
 16. Hearing on S.B. 219, supra note 6. 




III explain the current federal and state statutory frameworks governing 
wage discrimination, respectively. These sections include a discussion of 
the rights, exceptions, defenses, and procedural mechanisms used to sue 
under each statutory provision, as well as how the different statutory 
provisions are interrelated or contradictory. Additionally, Part II and Part 
III illustrate the current problems, difficulties, and ambiguities associated 
with both the federal and state laws governing equal pay rights and 
unlawful employment practices. Part IV discusses the recently proposed 
Louisiana bill, Senate Bill 219, which failed to make it to the House floor 
in the 2015 Regular Legislative Session, and analyzes changes that are 
needed for the proposal to successfully pass through the Louisiana 
Legislature and jumpstart the process of bridging gender wage inequality 
in Louisiana.  
I. THE HISTORY AND EFFECT OF THE GENDER WAGE GAP 
The term “gender wage gap” refers to the difference in women’s and 
men’s annual median earnings.17 This figure is reported as a ratio, but can 
also be reported as an actual pay gap in annual median earnings from the 
previous year.18 The earnings ratio is the ratio of women’s annual median 
salary and men’s annual median salary from the previous year.19 For 
example, women in the United States earned an annual median salary of 
$39,621 in 2014 and men earned an annual median salary of $50,383.20 
Therefore, the earnings ratio expressed as a percentage in 2014 was 79%.21 
The gender wage gap expressed as an actual pay gap is the difference in 
men’s annual median salary and women’s annual median salary, expressed 
as a percentage when divided by men’s annual median salary.22 For 
example, using the 2014 data from above, the pay gap was 21%.23 The 
gender wage gap can also be reported in terms of men’s and women’s 
median weekly earnings. The median weekly earnings tend to lead to a 
smaller gender wage gap than the annual median salary calculations. Thus, 
in 2014, the weekly gender wage gap was approximately 18%.24 Although 
                                                                                                             
 17. THE SIMPLE TRUTH, supra note 4, at 5. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id.  
 20. Id. at 7. 
 21. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT & BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED 
STATES: 2014, at 41 (2015).  
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. THE SIMPLE TRUTH, supra note 4, at 17. 




data confirms the existence of the gender wage gap, critics attempt to 
rationalize any wage discrepancy with an array of contributing factors.  
A. Explaining Away the Gender Wage Gap 
Although the gender wage gap has narrowed since the 1950s,25 it is far 
from being eradicated. Many scholars have suggested that the gap is 
explained by a variety of factors, including women’s personal choices, 
such as childbearing and childrearing; ethnicity and age; education level; 
occupational segregation; experience and labor force participation; and 
employer discrimination.26 However, none of these factors are sufficient 
to justify the entire gap between the wages of men and women.   
1. Childbearing and Childrearing 
Society expects that women will become mothers.27 Unfortunately, 
this societal expectation affects women’s status in the labor market.28 
Employers presume women will be short-term workers, as it is expected 
                                                                                                             
 25. The following are statistics of the pay gap for each year from 1960-2013: 
1960–60.7%; 1961–59.3%; 1962–59.3%; 1963–58.9%; 1964–59.1%; 1965–59.9%; 
1966–57.6%; 1967–57.8%; 1968–58.2%; 1969–60.5%; 1970–59.4%; 1971–59.5%; 
1972–57.9%; 1973–56.6%; 1974–58.8%; 1975–60.2%; 1976–58.9%; 1977–59.4%; 
1978–59.7%; 1979–60.2%; 1980–59.2%; 1981–61.7%; 1982–63.6%; 1983–63.7%; 
1984–64.6%; 1985–64.3%; 1986–65.2%; 1987–66%; 1988–68.7%; 1989–71.6%; 
1990–69.9%; 1991–70.8%; 1992–71.5%; 1993–72%; 1994–71.4%; 1995–73.8%; 
1996–74.2%; 1997–73.2%; 1998–73.2%; 1999–72.3%; 2000–73.7%; 2001–76.3%; 
2002–76.6%; 2003–75.5%; 2004–76.6%; 2005–77%; 2006–76.9%; 2007–77.8% or 
22.2%; 2008–77.1%; 2009–77%; 2010–76.9%; 2011–77%; 2012–76.5%; and 2013–
78.3%. The Wage Gap Over Time, supra note 4. 
 26. Kulow, supra note 11, at 393.  
 27. See Jessica Valenti, Not Wanting Kids is Entirely Normal, ATLANTIC (Sept. 
19, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/09/not-wanting-kids-is-
entirely-normal/262367/ [https://perma.cc/2G44-HQLM]; Jessica Valenti, Are All 
Women Born to be Mothers?, WASH. POST (Aug. 31, 2012), https://www.washington 
post.com/opinions/are-all-women-born-to-be-mothers/2012/08/31/b5df2f0e-f2b1-11 
e1-adc6-87dfa8eff430_story.html?utm_term=.55a11d84ad0b [https://perma.cc/4P68 
-D4ZF]. See also January W. Payne, Forever Pregnant, WASH. POST (May 16, 2006), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/15/AR2006051500 
875.html [https://perma.cc/BFJ2-72H9]; Kay Johnson et al., Recommendations to 
Improve Preconception Health and Health Care—United States, 55 MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WEEKLY REP., Apr. 21, 2006, at 7.   
 28. Id. 




they will be out of the labor force for certain periods to raise a family.29 
Employers do not typically associate this expectation with men as 
fathers.30 A study by the American Association of University Women 
found that ten years after graduating college, 23% of mothers did not work, 
but 17% worked part-time.31 However, during the same period, only 1% 
of fathers did not work, and only 2% worked part-time.32 By 1998, mothers 
contributed to income in approximately 65.3% of families with children 
under 18, although only 46.6% did in 1975.33 These statistics show that 
over time women have entered the workforce in more numbers and have 
contributed more to their family’s income. 
When mothers decide to return to the workforce, they are affected by 
the “motherhood” or “mommy” penalty, which is the idea that working 
mothers will face even larger disparities in pay or benefits than men or 
even women who do not have children.34 One study found that men receive 
a 2.1% boost after having a child, a benefit not afforded to working 
mothers.35 Childbearing and childrearing alone do not account for the 
entire gender wage gap, however, as women without children still 
experience inequity in pay compared to men. Another study found that a 
                                                                                                             
 29. See Derek Thompson, The Biggest Myth About the Gender Wage Gap, 
ATLANTIC (May 30, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/05 
/the-biggest-myth-about-the-gender-wage-gap/276367/ [https://perma.cc/Y4LM-FB 
3C].  
 30. See Peggy Drexler, Stay-at-Home Dads Will Never Become the Norm, 
TIME (Aug. 21, 2013), http://ideas.time.com/2013/08/21/viewpoint-stay-at-home-
dads-will-never-become-the-norm/ [https://perma.cc/5WN2-MCHW].  
 31. JUDY GOLDBERG DEY & CATHERINE HILL, AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, 
BEHIND THE PAY GAP (2007), https://www.aauw.org/files/2013/02/Behind-the-
Pay-Gap.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WVA-9JM8].  
 32. Id.  
 33. New and Stronger Remedies Are Needed to Reduce Gender-Based Wage 
Discrimination: Hearing Before the U.S. Senate Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor 
and Pensions, 106th Cong. 11 (2000) (statement of Heidi I. Hartmann, Director, 
Institute for Women’s Policy Research). In 2010, mothers who had children under 
six had a labor force participation rate of 62.5%. NAT’L EQUAL PAY TASK FORCE, 
FIFTY YEARS AFTER THE EQUAL PAY ACT: ASSESSING THE PAST, TAKING STOCK 
OF THE FUTURE 20–21 (2013). 
 34. Allison Linn, Women Can Have It All—But They’ll Likely Pay a Mommy 
Penalty For It, NBC NEWS (Nov. 15, 2013, 5:11 AM), http://www.nbcnews 
.com/business/women-can-have-it-all-theyll-likely-pay-mommy-penalty-2D115913 
90 [https://perma.cc/THT4-GA2V].  
 35. Equal Pay for Equal Work? New Evidence on the Persistence of the 
Gender Pay Gap: Hearing Before Joint Econ. Comm., 111th Cong. 2 (2009). This 
boost is called the “daddy bonus.” See Linn, supra note 34.  




woman without children who worked full-time earned only 82% of what 
a full-time working male earned.36 For a woman without children, losing 
18 cents per male dollar is better than the 23-cent difference that mothers 
lose, but this factor does not account for the entirety of gender wage 
inequality.37 
2. Ethnicity and Age 
Even though Asian-American, Hispanic, African-American, and 
Caucasian women all experience different levels of wage disparity when 
compared with men, this disparity does not eliminate all wage inequality for 
women.38 Hispanic and African-American women make approximately 
89% of what their male counterparts make, while Caucasian and Asian-
American women make 78% and 79%, respectively, of what their male 
counterparts earn.39 Therefore, even race or ethnicity cannot explain the 
entire gender wage gap, just as other explanations offered by critics cannot. 
As do many of the justifications offered by those who believe the gender 
wage gap is a myth, age does not diminish the wage gap. Many women start 
a career with a smaller pay disparity compared to men who do the same type 
and classification of work, but that gap will only expand over time.40 For 
example, in 2012, women aged 16 to 24 earned approximately 89 cents on 
the male dollar, women aged 24 to 34 earned about 90% of what men made, 
and women aged 35 and older earned between 75% and 78% of what men 
of the same age earned.41 Generally, women will experience a wage 
                                                                                                             
 36. Kulow, supra note 11, at 399–400.  
 37. Id. 
 38. THE SIMPLE TRUTH, supra note 4, at 11. Nationally, Asian-American 
women earn approximately 90% of what a Caucasian male earns. Hispanic and 
Latina women, however, earned approximately 54% of what a Caucasian male 
made. Id. 
 39. Alanna Vagianos, The Gender Pay Gap is Alive and Well in All 50 States, 
Shows Study, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 13, 2014, 7:06 AM), http://www.huffington 
post.com/2014/03/13/gender-wage-gap-study-aauw_n_4950430.html [https://perma 
.cc/J94X-ZX3H].  
 40. THE SIMPLE TRUTH, supra note 4, at 8.  
 41. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, REPORT 1045, HIGHLIGHTS OF 
WOMEN’S EARNINGS IN 2012, at 9 tbl.1 (2013). In 2013, women aged 20–24 were 
paid 90% of what men of the same age were paid; women aged 55–64 were paid 
77% of what men in the same age range were paid. After age 35, earnings begin to 
grow more slowly. THE SIMPLE TRUTH, supra note 4, at 12.  




inequality plateau42 after age 45 and a drop in wages after age 65.43 This 
evidence indicates that although many might expect gender wage disparity 
to decrease as women age and spend more time in the labor market, this is 
not always the case, and gender wage inequality can grow with age. 
3. Education 
Similar to age, gender wage disparity can grow as women’s education 
level attainment increases. The gap would presumably be smaller at higher 
levels of education, but this presumption is not always the reality. From the 
1970s to the present, women earned less than men with the same level of 
education.44 Nationally, women who earned a high school diploma made 
approximately $21,000 per year, and men with a GED or high school 
diploma earned approximately $22,000 per year.45 Women with an 
advanced degree—including a master’s, professional, or doctoral degree—
earned an average annual salary of $52,000, while men with a bachelor’s 
degree earned approximately $58,000 per year.46 Finally, women with a 
master’s degree are paid on average 70 cents on the dollar for what men with 
a master’s degree are paid, and even women with a doctorate degree are paid 
less than men with a master’s degree.47 This evidence shows that even as 
women attain higher levels of education, their wages compared to men only 
decrease.48 
                                                                                                             
 42. Generally, the wage inequality of women between the age of 45 and the 
age of 65 does not fluctuate. THE SIMPLE TRUTH, supra note 4, at 12 fig. 5. 
 43. THE SIMPLE TRUTH, supra note 4, at 12.  
 44. WOMEN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, THE EARNINGS GAP BETWEEN 
WOMEN AND MEN 2–3 (1976). “At every level of academic achievement, women’s 
median earnings are less than men’s median earning, and in some cases, the gender 
pay gap is larger at higher levels of education.” THE SIMPLE TRUTH, supra note 4, 
at 13. 
 45. Kulow, supra note 11, at 396.  
 46. Id.  
 47. Id.; Louisiana Women and the Wage Gap, NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN AND 
FAMILIES, http://www.nationalpartnership.org/research-library/workplace-fairness 
/fair-pay/9-2015-la-wage-gap.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SJQ-UHRM] (last visited Oct. 
13, 2016).  
 48. The examples in the text show that women with a high school diploma 
earned approximately 95% of what their male counterpart earned, women with an 
advanced degree earned 89.6% of what a man with a bachelor’s degree earned, 
and women with a master’s degree earned 70% of what a man with a master’s 
degree was paid, demonstrating that wage inequality actually increases as a 
woman’s education level rises.  




In Louisiana, the wage gap also exists as higher levels of educational 
attainment are reached, meaning education alone cannot account for the 
entire gender wage gap in the state.49 For example, a Louisiana woman 
with a high school diploma was paid only 55 cents compared to her male 
counterpart, and a woman with a bachelor’s degree was paid 75% of what 
a man with a bachelor’s degree was paid.50 As with United States women, 
Louisiana women who attain higher education levels—and who would 
likely have more occupational opportunities—still experience significant 
wage inequality. 
4. Occupational Segregation 
Critics of the gender wage gap also attempt justify wage inequality by 
referencing occupational segregation between men and women as a major 
factor.51 Occupational segregation is the historical sorting of women into 
certain fields, including teaching, nursing, and the service industry.52 
Those critics who point to this segregation as an explanation of wage 
inequality argue men and women occupy different categories of work, and 
those jobs deemed traditionally male pay better than those traditionally 
categorized as female.53  
                                                                                                             
 49. Beth Willinger, Closing the Gender Wage Gap: How are Louisiana Women 
Doing?, NEWCOMB C. CTR. FOR RES. ON WOMEN, http://www.tulane.edu 
/~wc/text/wagegap.html [https://perma.cc/RN6U-8PA2] (last visited Oct. 13, 2016).  
 50. The Importance of Fair Pay for Louisiana Women, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. 
CTR., https://nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/2012equalpay-factsheets/louisiana_ 
equalpaystatefactsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/EME5-XPUN] (last visited Oct. 13, 
2016).  
 51. Jan Diehm & Margaret Wheeler Johnson, Gender Wage Gap Heavily 
Influenced by Occupational Segregation, HUFFINGTON POST (June 11, 2013, 7:41 
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/11/gender-wage-gap_n_3424084.ht 
ml [https://perma.cc/G95H-897B]. See also NAT’L EQUAL PAY TASK FORCE, supra 
note 33, at 6–8. However, the National Equal Pay Task Force study shows that 
occupational segregation accounts for only 28% of the gender wage gap, meaning 
73% of the wage gap is unaccounted for after occupational segregation is removed. 
Id. at 17; see also Diehm & Wheeler Johnson, supra.  
 52. NAT’L EQUAL PAY TASK FORCE, supra note 33, at 6.  
 53. Occupational segregation can be viewed in two ways. First, through 
employer discrimination, meaning an employer is refusing to hire a certain class 
of employee and second, through employee choices, meaning an employee may 
not go into a certain field because of things like training and the hours required. 
NAT’L EQUAL PAY TASK FORCE, supra note 33, at 26. In 2014, approximately 
40% of women worked in traditionally female occupations, but only 5% of men 
worked in these jobs. About 43% men worked in traditionally male occupations 




Occupational segregation is also a significant issue in Louisiana. 
Women in Louisiana are generally segregated into jobs deemed traditionally 
female.54 In traditionally male jobs, such as business and financial 
operations, women made $23,083 less than men; as doctors, $35,700 less; 
and in management, $25,233 less.55 In fields in which women traditionally 
are more often employed, women still made less than men. For example, in 
sales, women made $23,666 less, and as teachers or librarians, women made 
$7,992 less than men.56 Just 11% of Louisiana women workers occupy the 
top executive, administrative, or managerial positions in the state.57 Even 
when women move into the labor force and into jobs not traditionally 
deemed women’s jobs, gender wage inequality persists. 
5. Experience and Labor Force Participation 
Behind the concept of experience and labor force participation is the 
idea that men experience fewer gaps in employment and as a result have 
more tenure, experience, training, and participation in the labor force.58 One 
study found that women had approximately 12 years of labor experience 
compared to men’s 16 years.59 The study also found that women worked 
about 472 hours fewer than men each year.60 Additionally, estimates state 
                                                                                                             
and just over 5% of women were in those jobs. Women were likely to work in 
professional, administrative support, sales, and service occupations, although men 
were likely to work in construction, maintenance and repair, and production and 
transportation occupations. THE SIMPLE TRUTH, supra note 4, at 15.  
 54. Louisiana Women and the Wage Gap, supra note 47.  
In the health care and social assistance industry, women are paid just 71 
cents for every dollar paid to men. In manufacturing, just 73 cents. In 
retail trade, 76 cents. And in educational services, women are paid 86 
cents for every dollar paid to men. Across all industries, women are paid 
lower salaries than men. 
Id. In sales, women are paid just 64 cents for every dollar paid to men. In production, 
just 67 cents. In management, 77 cents. In office and administrative support 
occupations, women are paid just 86 cents for every dollar paid to men. Id. 
 55. Louisiana: State of Pay Inequity, LA. PROGRESS, http://www.louis 
ianaprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/April_2013_-_Policy_Brief_-_Pay_ 
Inequity.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MMA-5EFJ] (last visited Oct. 13, 2016).  
 56. Id. 
 57. Willinger, supra note 49. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Gary Siniscalco et al., The Pay Gap, The Glass Ceiling, and Pay Bias: 
Moving Forward Fifty Years After the Equal Pay Act, 29 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. 
LAW 395, 405 (2014). 
 60. Id. 




that women spend approximately three times more time outside the 
workforce then men.61 However, from 1950 to 1998, women’s labor force 
participation increased from 33.9 million workers to 59.8 million 
workers.62 This statistic means women’s labor force participation rose by 
25.9 million between 1950 and 1998.63 Meanwhile, men’s labor force 
participation decreased by 11.5 million, falling from 86.4 million to 78.9 
million between 1950 and 1998.64  
During the First and Second World Wars, many women began to work 
outside the home,65 and following those wars, the idea of women having a 
job, other than that of housewife and mother, took root.66 Unfortunately, 
this phenomenon is also where the gender wage gap began. When a 
woman moved into the workforce, her wages were significantly lower than 
her male counterpart’s wages,67 meaning pay equity did not follow this 
feminization of the workplace.68 Some progress toward pay equity was 
made in the 1980s, as even more women flocked into the national 
workforce. By 1985, women’s labor force participation had increased to 
                                                                                                             
 61. Id. 
 62. Howard N. Fullerton, Jr., Labor Force Participation: 75 Years of 
Change, 1950–1998 and 1998–2005, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Dec. 1999, at 3, 4.  
 63. Id. at 6. 
 64. Id. Across all age groups, men’s labor force participation decreased between 
1950 and 1998, while women’s labor force participation increased in all age groups 
except age 65 and older. Id. The study predicts that by 2025 the difference in men and 
women’s will be 10.6 million, a significant decrease from the difference of 52.5 
million in 1950. Id. at 5.  
 65. See Lyna Tucker, How Women Helped Win the Great War, U.S. ARMY (Nov. 
10, 2008), https://www.army.mil/article/14061/How_women_helped_win_the_Great 
_War [https://perma.cc/YV9X-9ZLG]; American Women in World War II: On the 
Home Front and Beyond, NAT’L WORLD WAR II MUSEUM, http://www.national 
ww2museum.org/learn/education/for-students/ww2-history/at-a-glance/women-in-w 
w2.html [https://perma.cc/2HLL-LK5N] (last visited Oct. 13, 2016).  
 66. See Women and Work After World War II, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wg 
bh/americanexperience/features/general-article/tupperware-work/ [https://perma.cc 
/2CUW-52CL] (last visited Sept. 29, 2016). See also Elaine Tyler May, Ambivalent 
Dreams: Women and the Home after World War II, 13 J. WOMEN’S HIST. 151, 151–
52 (2001). 
 67. Kulow, supra note 11, at 391. In 1950, 28% of women worked outside 
the home, but half of these women worked only part-time. Id. From 1950 to 1960, 
women earned 59 cents to 64 cents on the male dollar. Id. 
 68. Sharon M. Oster, The Gender Gap in Compensation: Is There a Policy 
Problem?: The Gender Wage Gap, 82 GEO. L.J. 109, 110 (1993). In 1960, 28% 
of married women were in the labor force, and only 18% of married women with 
children under six were in the work force. Id. 




64%, largely due to women with young children entering the labor force.69 
By the 1990s, a majority of United States women worked outside the home, 
with nearly three-quarters of mothers working full-time.70 Therefore, the 
justification that women do not have the training, experience, or 
participation in the labor force no longer rings as true as it might have in the 
1950s and 60s, and the difference in pay cannot be attributed solely to lack 
of experience, training, or labor force participation.71 
6. Discrimination 
Even after taking all the preceding explanations into account, a 
percentage of the gender wage gap still cannot be explained.72 One study 
found, after accounting for the preceding factors, a 7% difference still 
existed in male and female earnings one year after graduation, which grew 
to a 12% difference ten years after college graduation.73 The remaining 
portion of the gender wage gap is likely attributable to discrimination. 
However, this discrimination against women does not take only the form 
of wage discrimination. Women are also discriminated against in other 
aspects of their employment,74 and this labor force inflexibility makes 
bridging the gender wage gap difficult.  
                                                                                                             
 69. Id. 
 70. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, WOMEN IN AMERICA, INDICATORS OF SOCIAL 
AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING 27 (2011).  
 71. Kulow, supra note 11, at 397–98. 
 72. Id. at 405–06.  
 73. THE SIMPLE TRUTH, supra note 4, at 13. Other estimates state gender 
discrimination can account for 25% to 40% of the gender wage gap, depending on 
economists’ calculations. Vivien Labaton, Five Myths About the Gender Pay Gap, 
WASH. POST (July 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-
myths-about-the-gender-pay-gap/2014/07/25/9e5cff34-fcd5-11e3-8176-f2c941cf3 
5f1_story.html?utm_term=.9074a25ffe9d [https://perma.cc/LVP7-42HH]. 
 74. Willinger, supra note 49. For example,  
[T]he absence of flexible work schedules, sick leave, childcare facilities at 
educational institutions or work places, the failure of welfare programs to 
support women through completion of their education, reliable transportation, 
or assumptions by grammar schools that mothers are available 24/7 also serves 
as forms of discrimination against women workers. 
Id.  




B. The Gender Wage Gap in Louisiana 
Historically, in Louisiana, the gender wage gap has been substantially 
larger than the national gap.75 Unfortunately, because the gender wage gap 
records for Louisiana are not as plentiful as the national records, only a 
certain time period of Louisiana data is available.76 Louisiana women are 
also in the labor force in fewer numbers than women nationally.77 
However, labor force participation for Louisiana women with young 
children is almost identical to the national average.78 Even with Louisiana 
women composing approximately 44% of the state’s workforce,79 in 2014, 
Louisiana was again ranked last—coming in at 65 cents on the male dollar, 
                                                                                                             
 75. Women Can’t Afford Unfair Pay Today, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR., 
https://nwlc.org/womenunfairpayfactsheet/ [https://perma.cc/4WCG-UVTD] (last 
visited Oct. 13, 2016). The following are statistics for the gender wage gap in 
Louisiana during the mid–2000s to the present: 2004–67.9%; 2005–68.6%; 2006–
66.2%; 2007–65.4%; 2008–67.3%; 2009–66.4%; 2010–67.2%; 2011–68.8%; 
2012–66.9%; and 2013–65.9%. PETER FRONCZEK, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, 
EARNINGS, AND POVERTY DATA FROM THE 2004 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 
REPORT 8 (2005); JOHN H. WEBSTER, JR. & ALEMAYEHU BISHAW, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, INCOME, EARNINGS, AND POVERTY DATA FROM THE 2005 AMERICAN 
COMMUNITY SURVEY REPORT 9 (2006); JOHN H. WEBSTER, JR. & ALEMAYEHU 
BISHAW, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, EARNINGS, AND POVERTY DATA FROM 
THE 2006 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY REPORT 14 (2007); ALEMAYEHU 
BISHAW & JESSICA SEMEGA, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, EARNINGS, AND 
POVERTY DATA FROM THE 2007 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY REPORT 13 
(2008); DAVID M. GETZ, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MEN’S AND WOMEN’S EARNINGS 
BY STATES AND METROPOLITAN AREAS: 2009, at 4 (2010); Women Can’t Afford 
Unfair Pay Today, supra; 2011 Wage Gap: State Rankings, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. 
CTR., http://www.nwlc.org/resource/2011-wage-gap-state-rankings [https://perma 
.cc/5TAR-647S] (last visited Nov. 1, 2016); The Wage Gap by State for Women 
Overall, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files 
/pdfs/wage_gap_tables_2013_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/XP27-QHNY] (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2016). 
 76. See supra note 75.  
 77. Willinger, supra note 49, at 2. In 2002, 60.2% of women in the United 
States were in the work force, but only 54.2% of Louisiana women were in the 
work force, making Louisiana 50th among the states and the District of Columbia 
in female work force participation. Id. 
 78. Id. at 3. Approximately 63.2% of Louisiana women with children under 
six are in the labor force, which is almost identical to the national participation of 
63.5%. Id. 
 79. See Office of Women’s Policy Newsletters, DEP’T OF CHILD. & FAM. SVCS., 
http://www.dcfs.la.gov/index.cfm?md=pagebuilder&tmp=home&pid=404 [https://per 
ma.cc/BE8X-REMD] (last visited Nov. 1, 2016) (scroll down to November 2014).  




or a 35% pay gap.80 Although Louisiana women compose a significant 
portion of the labor force in the state, their efforts are not rewarded with 
gender wage equality. 
C. The Effect of the Gender Wage Gap on Louisiana Women and 
Families 
Families have increasingly come to rely on women’s wages to make ends 
meet.81 From 1967 to 2012, the percentage of mothers who brought home at 
least one-fourth of the family’s earnings increased from 28% to 63%.82 Now, 
approximately 40% of mothers with children under the age of 18 are the 
family’s sole or primary breadwinner.83 The pay gap can contribute to poor 
nutrition, poor living conditions, and fewer opportunities for children.84 
Across all families in the United States, income losses attributable to the 
gender wage gap totaled $200.6 billion in 1997.85 This number would be even 
larger when adjusted for inflation. To these mothers and their families, 
bridging the gender wage gap is more than a source of pride—it is a necessity 
to provide for their families.86  
Reforming the gender wage gap in Louisiana would mean even more to 
Louisiana women and families, as it is significantly larger than the national 
average. In Louisiana, women head 16.6% of the households, compared to 
12.2% nationally.87 Additionally, all women in Louisiana who are employed 
                                                                                                             
 80. THE SIMPLE TRUTH, supra note 4, at 7. Women in Louisiana earned an annual 
average of $31,586, although men in Louisiana earned on average $48,382. Id. 
 81. Louisiana Women and the Wage Gap, supra note 47. 
 82. THE SIMPLE TRUTH, supra note 4, at 4. 
 83. Brigid Schulte, Nearly 40 Percent of Mothers Are Now the Family 
Breadwinners, Report Says, WASH. POST (May 29, 2013), https://www.washing 
tonpost.com/local/nearly-40-percent-of-mothers-are-now-the-family-breadwinners- 
report-says/2013/05/28/8de03ec8-c7bb-11e2-9245-773c0123c027_story.html [https: 
//perma.cc/PH5V-NBGV].   
 84. Lindsay Blakely, Face the Facts: The Gender Pay Gap Is Real, CBS 
MONEY WATCH (Mar. 14, 2011, 4:27 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/face-
the-facts-gender-pay-gap-is-real/ [https://perma.cc/84L7-YTLQ].  
 85. New and Stronger Remedies Are Needed to Reduce Gender Based Wage 
Discrimination: Hearing Before the U.S. Senate Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor 
and Pensions, supra note 33 (statement of Heidi I. Hartmann, Director, Institute 
for Women’s Policy Research). 
 86. THE SIMPLE TRUTH, supra note 4, at 4. 
 87. See Willinger, supra note 49. In 2014, about 104,572 family households 
in Louisiana have incomes that fall below the poverty level, and eliminating the 
wage gap would provide much-needed income to women whose wages sustain 
families. Louisiana Women and the Wage Gap, supra note 47. In 2013, 




full-time lose a combined total of approximately $11 billion each year because 
of the gender wage gap.88 Families, businesses, and the state economy suffer 
as a result of this gap.89  
Individually, women making 77 cents on the male dollar can lose 
anywhere from $400,000 to $1.2 million over a working lifetime due to 
gender wage inequality.90 The amount a woman loses over her career varies 
with the educational level she attains, but at every level of education women 
lose a large number of earnings over a working lifetime. Other estimates 
propose that the gender wage gap will cost women anywhere from $400,000 
to $2 million over a lifetime.91 For women in Louisiana, the gap would be 
significantly larger over the course of a working lifetime due to the larger 
gender wage disparity plaguing the state. Although the amount a woman can 
lose over a working lifetime can vary, and no matter the individual wage gap 
a woman experiences, she loses a significant amount of money each year 
compared to a man. 
Women are shortchanged almost $11,000 a year compared to men.92 On 
average, women would lose $435,049 in a 40-year period because of the 
gender wage gap.93 This statistic means a woman would have to work 11 extra 
years to recoup lost earnings.94 This loss could be even greater, depending on 
the level of the woman’s education.95 Closing the gender wage gap could 
mean four months of groceries, three months of rent and utilities, five 
months of child care, five months of health insurance, four months of 
student loan payments, and five tanks of gas for a woman and her family.96 
                                                                                                             
approximately 296,000 families are headed by women, and 63.9% of women are 
the family’s primary or co-breadwinner, bringing in at least 25% of the family 
income. Louisiana: State of Pay Inequity, supra note 55.   
 88. Louisiana Women and the Wage Gap, supra note 46.  
 89. Id. 
 90. Kulow, supra note 11, at 385–86.  
 91. Catherine Lerum, Equal Pay for Women Can Become a Reality: A 
Proposal for Enactment of the Paycheck Fairness Act, 34 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 221, 
229 (2013) (quoting 155 Cong. Rec. H129 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 2009) (statement of 
Rep. Holt)). A high school graduate can lose over $700,000 in a working lifetime; 
a college graduate can lose $1.2 million; and a professional school graduate can 
lose $2 million. Id. at 231. 
 92. The Wage Gap is Stagnant for Nearly a Decade, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR., 
https://nwlc.org/resources/wage-gap-stagnant-nearly-decade [https://perma.cc/K8SX 
-SQ6D] (last visited Oct. 13, 2016).  
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. In 1974, women had to work nine days to make what men made in 
five days. WOMEN’S BUREAU, supra note 44.  
 95. See The Wage Gap is Stagnant for Nearly a Decade, supra note 92.  
 96. Women Can’t Afford Unfair Pay Today, supra note 75.  




Bridging gender wage inequality and providing women and families with 
these opportunities would contribute significantly to the nation’s future. 
Bridging the gender wage gap can also lift a significant number of 
Louisiana women and families out of poverty and can contribute to the 
economy of the state. If the gender wage gap in Louisiana were eradicated, 
an average working woman would have money for approximately 132 
more weeks of food for her family, nearly 14 more months of mortgage 
and utilities payments, nearly 21 more months of rent, or 4,822 additional 
gallons of gas.97 As with United States women in general, closing 
Louisiana’s gender wage gap can afford women and families greater 
opportunities while reducing the need for scattered and ineffective 
legislative measures. 
II. THE FEDERAL FRAMEWORK FOR EQUAL PAY 
RIGHTS AND ITS FAILURES 
Currently, equal pay protections are spread throughout various federal 
statutes.98 Each statute has its own protections, prohibitions, defenses, 
burdens, and remedies.99 This array of protective measures can present 
several problems for women who have suffered discrimination,100 such as 
proving she receives a lower wage than a man, what elements she must 
prove, who will bear the burden of persuasion, and what type of defenses 
an employer may successfully be able to assert, among others.101  
A. The Equal Pay Act of 1963 
The Equal Pay Act of 1963 was the first legislative attempt to eradicate 
the gender wage gap that plagued the United States.102 The Equal Pay Act 
                                                                                                             
 97. Louisiana Women and the Wage Gap, supra note 47. By eradicating the 
gap, Louisiana women could afford almost a year’s worth of housing, that is, rent, 
mortgage, and taxes; or utilities, food, transportation, and internet; or one year’s 
worth of a college education, plus pension and social security contributions, as 
well as healthcare costs. Louisiana: State of Pay Inequity, supra note 55.   
 98. See 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; 29 U.S.C. § 201.  
 99. Id. 
 100. The federal laws discussed in this section apply to any employee—male 
or female—who has experienced discrimination. However, for purposes of this 
Comment the author uses “women” when discussing discrimination claims under 
the laws.  
 101. See discussion infra Part II.E.  
 102. Kulow, supra note 11, at 392. 




added prohibitions to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”),103 
which applies to both unionized employees and non-unionized 
employees.104 The Equal Pay Act added a subsection prohibiting 
discrimination within an establishment among employees “on the basis of 
sex.”105 Specifically, an employer is prohibited from paying employees in 
the same establishment different wages than would be paid to an employee 
of the opposite sex for work that requires “equal skill, effort, and 
responsibility”106 and is “performed under similar working conditions.”107 
To meet the burden for a claim of a violation of the Equal Pay Act, an 
employee must first prove that she is being paid less than her male 
comparator.108 Issues arise when a female employee is being paid less than 
some male comparators but more than others. The federal circuits are split 
on whether the female employee must prove she is paid less than only one 
male comparator or whether she is paid less than the average of all male 
comparators.109 This standard means, in addition to discovering she is 
being discriminated against, a woman then will not know whether she 
must prove her pay is less than only one male worker or all other male 
workers. This difficulty is coupled with all of the other statutory 
requirements to prove gender wage discrimination. 
For example, an employee must also prove that her job requires “equal 
skill, effort, and responsibility” as her male comparator’s.110 Courts will 
                                                                                                             
 103. The FLSA is a federal provision that establishes a minimum wage and 
governs recordkeeping, overtime compensation, and child labor standards. The 
law applies to almost every employer in the United States, including federal, state, 
and local governments. The employers covered are those engaging in interstate 
commerce, producing goods for interstate commerce, or handling, selling, or 
working on goods that have been produced or moved in interstate commerce. 29 
U.S.C. § 203. See also Wages and Hours Worked: Minimum Wage and Overtime 
Pay, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., https://webapps.dol.gov/elaws/elg/minwage.htm 
[https://perma.cc/B4WL-XZ2V] (last visited Nov. 2, 2016).  
 104. Fair Labor Standards Act Advisor, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., http://webapps 
.dol.gov/elaws/whd/flsa/scope/screen10.asp [https://perma.cc/J3FS-DCTB] (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2016).  
 105. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). The law also contains a no-retaliation provision, 
which prevents an employer from retaliating or otherwise discriminating against 
an employee who brings an action under the Equal Pay Act’s provisions or aids 
another employee’s action. Id. § 215(a)(3).  
 106. Id. § 206(d)(1). 
 107. Id.  
 108. 6 LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 107.07 (2d ed. 2008). 
 109. Id. See, e.g., Hein v. Or. Coll. of Educ., 718 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1983); 
Brock v. Georgia Southwestern Coll., 765 F.2d 1026 (11th Cir. 1985). 
 110. 29 C.F.R. § 1620.14(a) (2016); LARSON, supra note 108, § 107.09. 




consider factors such as the “experience, training, education, and 
ability”111 required for the job to determine if the equal-skill hurdle is 
met.112 The equal-effort requirement concerns the “measurement of the 
physical or mental exertion needed”113 for job performance.114 For the 
equal-responsibility requirement, courts will look at “the degree of 
accountability required for the performance of the job, with emphasis on 
the importance of the job obligation.”115 An employee must also prove that 
the jobs are performed under similar working conditions.116 Differences in 
working conditions generally fall into two broad categories—differences 
in place and differences in time.117 Even if an employee can successfully 
allege and prove all of these requirements, an employer may still escape 
liability for wage discrimination based on gender. 
The prohibition against employer action is not without its exceptions, 
as the Equal Pay Act grants an employer four affirmative defenses for any 
differential in pay between female and male workers.118 The first 
affirmative defense is a seniority system.119 This type of system allows an 
employer to compensate employees differently based on a systematic plan 
that accounts for how long an employee has been on the job.120 The plan 
                                                                                                             
 111. 29 C.F.R. § 1620.15(a); LARSON, supra note 108, § 107.09. 
 112. LARSON, supra note 108, § 107.09. See also 29 C.F.R. § 1620.15(a). The 
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 113. 29 C.F.R. § 1620.16(a). See also LARSON, supra note 108, § 107.09. 
 114. 29 C.F.R. § 1620.16(a). See also LARSON, supra note 108, § 107.09.  
 115. 29 C.F.R. § 1620.17(a). Some factors considered under this analysis are 
supervisory authority of the two employees being compared, decision-making 
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LARSON, supra note 108, § 107.07. 
 116. 29 C.F.R. § 1620.18(a). The statute requires that the working conditions 
be similar rather than equal. Id. 
 117. LARSON, supra note 108, § 107.09. Differences in time will encompass 
exposure to elements, unpleasant surroundings and hazards. Differences in time 
include different shifts, which are not recognized by the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Id. 
 118. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012).  
 119. Id. 
 120. LARSON, supra note 108, § 107.11. The term “seniority system” is not 
defined in the Equal Pay Act, but has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in a 
Title VII context to mean a system that relies on relative lengths of employee 
services. Id. See also Cal. Brewers Ass’n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 606 (1980).  




must be applied equally to men and women to qualify as a legitimate 
defense.121 The second affirmative defense given to employers is a merit 
system,122 which has been defined as “an organized and structured 
procedure whereby employees are evaluated systematically according to 
predetermined criteria.”123 The third affirmative defense is a system that 
“measures earnings by quantity or quality of production.”124 This system 
is easier to analyze than the previous two defenses because it requires a 
non-subjective inquiry.125 The final affirmative defense the Equal Pay Act 
grants to employers is any differential “based on any other factor other 
than sex,”126 commonly referred to as the “catch-all” defense, which can 
encompass a varying array of factors an employer chooses to assert.127 
These defenses allow the employer to legitimately pay female and male 
workers different rates of pay—even if an employee can demonstrate she 
does similar work to a male comparator and is being paid less for that 
work. 
To bring a successful claim under the Equal Pay Act, an employee 
must first prove a prima facie case for a violation of the provisions of the 
Equal Pay Act.128 Once the employee has shown the prima facie case, the 
                                                                                                             
 121. LARSON, supra note 108, § 107.11. 
 122. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). 
 123. LARSON, supra note 108, § 107.12 (quoting EEOC v. Aetna Ins. Co., 616 
F.2d 719, 725 (4th Cir. 1980)).  
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LARSON, supra note 108, § 30.04. 
 125. LARSON, supra note 108, § 107.13. 
 126. 29 U.S.C. § 206.  
 127. The fourth defense is referred to as a general catch-all category, which all 
the federal circuits interpret differently. LARSON, supra note 108, § 107.14. For 
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differentials, red circle rates, temporary reassignment, and training programs. 
Debra H. Goldstein, Sex-Based Wage Discrimination: Recovery Under the Equal 
Pay Act, Title VII, or Both, 56 ALA. L. REV. 294, 296–97 (1995). See also H.R. 
Rep. No. 88-309 (1963), as reprinted in 1963 U.S.C.C.A.N. 687, 689. There has 
been some criticism regarding the fourth affirmative defense under the Equal Pay 
Act. For example, “Depending on the circuit, a defendant may avoid liability by 
doing as little as proffering a factor that is facially gender neutral, or he may have 
to do as much as proving the factor is a bona fide legitimate business reason.” 
Peter Avery, The Diluted Equal Pay Act: How Was It Broken? How Can It Be 
Fixed?, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 849, 863 (2004). These differing standards create 
inconsistencies and an inability for the plaintiff to know if her claim will survive 
the shifting-burden stage of an Equal Pay Act analysis. 
 128. LARSON, supra note 108, § 108.10. This shifting of the burden means an 
employee bringing a claim must prove she is being paid less than a male 




burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to show one of the affirmative 
defenses applies to the wage differential at issue.129 A plaintiff will have two 
years to file a claim of discrimination from when she knows or should have 
reasonably known of the discriminatory practice130 and will be eligible for 
two years of back pay from the time the lawsuit was commenced, as well as 
liquidated damages, attorney’s fees, and court costs.131 This law provides 
some relief for women who have experienced discrimination, but federal 
law also provides other protections and remedies for wage discrimination.132 
B. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“CRA”),133 particularly Title VII, also 
gives protections to women regarding their compensation. Title VII makes 
it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate in 
compensation because of sex.134 The term “employer” used in the CRA is 
fairly broad, meaning that most—if not all—employers in the United States 
                                                                                                             
comparator for equal work requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility and that 
the job is performed under similar working conditions. See discussion supra notes 
108–17 and accompanying text. The prima facie burden for a plaintiff does not 
require a showing of discriminatory intent on the part of the employer, as the 
statute is a strict liability statute. LARSON, supra note 108, § 108.10.  
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. § 108.08. The statute of limitations period is extended to three years 
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 132. See discussion infra Part II.B–D.  
 133. Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). 
 134. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). The term “compensation” in the law 
covers wages as well as fringe benefits, such as retirement and pension benefits. 
LARSON, supra note 108, § 110.01. The law also contains a no-retaliation 
provision. It states,  
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to 
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment 
. . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment 
practice by this title, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, 
or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing 
under this title. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 




are covered by the definition.135 There are two types of cases for gender 
wage discrimination under Title VII—disparate treatment and disparate 
impact.136 Under a disparate-treatment theory, an employee alleges that 
she is a member of a protected class and she occupies a job similar to a 
higher-paid male employee.137 In a disparate-impact case, the employee is 
alleging that the employer’s policies result in a negative impact on a 
protected class of individuals, such as sex.138 As under the Equal Pay Act, 
even if an employee can successfully allege a prima facie case of gender 
wage discrimination, an employer can still escape liability. 
Title VII grants employers several exceptions as to what will not 
constitute an unlawful employment practice,139 thus preventing an 
employer from being liable to an employee who has experienced 
discrimination. The first affirmative defense afforded is a bona fide 
seniority or merit system.140 The second defense is a system that “measures 
earnings by quantity or quality of production.”141 Finally, an employer can 
differentiate in pay to employees who work in different locations.142 
Additionally, Title VII states that it will not be an unlawful employment 
                                                                                                             
 135. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Title VII defines an employer as 
[A] person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen 
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 136. LARSON, supra note 108, § 1.09. 
 137. Id. § 8.08, at 8-20 n.93. “Disparate treatment” in a gender context means 
that an employer is treating the employee differently from others simply because 
of her gender. Id. § 8.06. 
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 139. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-h(2). 
 140. Id. A seniority system can be a protected defense if it is based on custom 
and practice, even if the system is not written into employer guidelines. LARSON, 
supra note 108, § 30.02. Because the language applying to merit systems under 
the Equal Pay Act and Title VII are similar, courts normally analyze these 
defenses similarly. Id. See also supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text.  
 141. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). This defense can be used for disparate impact 
claims. LARSON, supra note 108, § 30.04. 
 142. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). 




practice for an employer to differentiate in compensation based on sex if 
the differential treatment is allowed under the regulations of the FLSA.143 
However, all of these defenses must not be the result of an intention to 
discriminate on the basis of sex.144 Similar to the Equal Pay Act, if an 
employer can prove that one or more of these exceptions applies, then 
there is no liability for discrimination in wages. 
Unlike the Equal Pay Act’s system, the system to file a claim under 
Title VII is more complex. Title VII creates the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) to which a plaintiff must file any 
allegations of wage discrimination before she can proceed with a claim in 
federal court.145 A Title VII plaintiff will bear the burden of persuasion 
throughout the claim.146 First, the plaintiff is required prove a prima facie 
case of discrimination, and she will also bear the burden of persuading the 
fact finder that any affirmative defense articulated by the employer does 
not apply.147 A plaintiff faces an additional hurdle that a claim under Title 
VII must be filed with the EEOC within 180 or 300 days of the adoption 
of the discriminatory practice, depending on whether the state has its own 
human rights agency.148 An employee who has successfully alleged and 
                                                                                                             
 143. Id. This exception would incorporate the affirmative defenses granted 
under the Equal Pay Act. See discussion supra Part II.A.  
 144. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). These defenses mean means Title VII is not a 
strict liability statute because intent to discriminate based on sex must be shown. 
 145. Id. § 2000e-4. Therefore, a plaintiff must exhaust all administrative 
remedies before a claim of discrimination can be brought in federal court. 
 146. LAWRENCE SOLOTOFF & HENRY S. KRAMER, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORK PLACE 8–37 (2006). 
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she is a member of a protected class and that she has not been treated as well as a 
similarly situated employee who is not in the protected class. Goldstein, supra 
note 127, at 297. Once a plaintiff proves the two requirements, the burden shifts 
to the employer to articulate a legitimate and non-discriminatory reason for the 
salary disparity. LARSON, supra note 108, § 8.08, at 8-20 n.93. These factors can 
include length of service, seniority, education, experience, differences in the 
category of job, differences in duties and responsibilities, complexity of the work, 
productivity, skill, or another non-discriminatory factor. Id. § 13.01. Once the 
employer articulates a defense, the employee will bear the burden of persuading 
the fact finder that the articulated reason is simply a pretext for discrimination. Id. 
§ 8.08. Examples include that the advance education or experience the employer 
claimed was not needed for the job category at issue or that the employer did not 
adopt the low wage practice for other employees. Id. § 13.01. 
 148. A claim must be filed within 180 days if the state has a human rights 
agency and within 300 days if the state does not have such an agency. 42 U.S.C. 
§2000e-5(e). 




proved wage discrimination under Title VII is entitled to different forms 
of relief depending on whether her claim was for disparate treatment or 
disparate impact.149 In many cases, women are not aware there has been a 
discriminatory employment practice adopted until well after the filing 
deadline has passed, making filing a claim under this provision 
challenging for many women employees, such as Ms. Lilly Ledbetter.150 
C. The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 
The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 (“LLFPA”) resulted from a 
Congressional overruling of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ledbetter v. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.151 The LLFPA added language to the 
definition of an unlawful employment practice for purposes of a Title VII 
claim.152 This definition was expanded to effectively restart the statute of 
                                                                                                             
 149. An employee who alleges and proves disparate treatment would be 
eligible for unpaid wages, punitive damages, and compensatory damages, 
whereas a plaintiff who alleges and proves disparate impact would not be eligible 
for punitive and compensatory damages, but would be eligible for back wages. 
LARSON, supra note 108, §§ 3.09, 31.01. In both disparate treatment and disparate 
impact, a successful plaintiff can receive attorney’s fees. Id. §§ 3.09, 31.01 n.2 
(citing Richardson v. Lamar Cty. Bd. of Educ., 729 F. Supp. 806 (M.D. Ala. 
1989); Jones v. Miss. Dep’t of Corr., 615 F. Supp. 456 (N.D. Miss. 1985)), 97.01. 
The amount of punitive and compensatory damages available in disparate 
treatment vary according to the size of the employer. Id. § 3.09.  
 150. See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007). See 
also Jonathan Timm, When the Boss Says, ‘Don’t Tell Your Coworkers How Much 
You Get Paid’, ATLANTIC (Jul. 15, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/bus 
iness/archive/2014/07/when-the-boss-says-dont-tell-your-coworkers-how-much-
you-get-paid/374467/ [https://perma.cc/W4X6-YQNA]; Jennifer Lawrence, Why 
Do I Make Less Than My Male Co-Stars, LENNY (Oct. 13, 2015), 
http://www.lennyletter.com/work/a147/jennifer-lawrence-why-do-i-make-less-
than-my-male-costars/ [https://perma.cc/F8TL-L9KJ]. Ms. Ledbetter worked for 
Goodyear for 19 years before she discovered she was being paid significantly less 
than her male counterparts. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 621. She brought claims for 
wage discrimination under the Equal Pay Act and Title VII, but the Supreme 
Court ruled that her Title VII claims fell outside the statute of limitations because 
she did not assert that her employer had discriminatory intent when it issued her 
paychecks or denied her raise. Id. at 637.  
 151. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. 618; see also Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5). 
 152. The LLFPA states,  
For purposes of this section, an unlawful employment practice occurs, 
with respect to discrimination in compensation in violation of this 
subchapter, when a discriminatory compensation decision or other 




limitations period each time a discriminatory paycheck is issued.153 Even 
with this expansion, discovery that wage discrimination has occurred is 
challenging, particularly as the United States operates under a social norm 
of pay secrecy.154 
D. National Labor Relations Act 
The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) is important in the 
employment discrimination context because it governs pay secrecy and 
confidentiality (“PSC”) rules.155 These types of rules, imposed by employers, 
prevent employees from discussing their wages with one another.156 The 
NLRA prohibits an employer from requiring employees not to disclose or 
discuss their wages as a condition of employment.157 However, the NLRA 
                                                                                                             
practice is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to a 
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, or when an 
individual is affected by application of a discriminatory compensation 
decision or other practice, including each time wages, benefits or other 
compensation is paid, resulting in whole or in part from such a decision 
or other practice. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A). The LLFPA also allowed an employee to recover 
back wages up to two years before the discrimination claim was filed when the 
unlawful employment practices that were within the filing period were similar to 
those practices that occurred outside the filing period. Id. 
 153. GARY SINISCALCO ET AL., DEVELOPMENTS IN EQUAL PAY LAW: THE LILLY 
LEDBETTER ACT AND BEYOND 3 (2010), http://www.americanbar.org/content 
/dam/aba/administrative/labor_law/meetings/2010/2010_eeo_007.authcheckdam.p
df [https://perma.cc/7ZX8-N49G]. 
 154. Gowri Ramachandran, Pay Transparency, PENN. ST. L. REV. 1043, 1044 
(2012).  
 155. Rafael Gely & Leonard Bierman, Pay Secrecy/Confidentiality Rules and 
the Nat’l Labor Relations Act, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 121, 126–31 (2003). 
 156. Id. at 124. See also DirectTV U.S. DirectTV Holdings, LLC, 359 
N.L.R.B. No. 54, Jan. 23, 2013. In DirectTV, the NLRB considered an employer 
rule, which stated in part, 
Never discuss details about your job, company business or work projects 
with anyone outside the company, especially in public venues, such as 
seminars and conferences, or via online posting or information-sharing 
forums, such as mailing lists, websites, blogs and chat rooms. 
Id. at *7. The NLRB held that this rule could be reasonably construed to 
prohibit protected section 7 activity. Id. at *1.  
 157. Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, “Love, Sex and Politics? Sure. Salary? 
No Way”: Workplace Social Norms and the Law, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. 
L. 167, 169–70 (2004). The NLRA protects the rights of all employees to engage 
in “concerted activity for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection.” 29 U.S.C. 




does not include within its definition of “employee” those who are 
categorized as supervisors,158 meaning there is an entire class of 
employees not protected by the provisions. Even those employees 
protected by the NLRA will have issues benefitting from its protections.159 
The National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) reviews employment 
practices, but only after an employee, union, or employer submits a formal 
allegation that a violation of the NLRA has occurred.160 Additionally, the 
only remedies available after a NLRB review will be a cease-and-desist 
order and other affirmative action necessary to promote the policies of the 
NLRA.161 Therefore, the NLRA is a reactive regime, as action is taken 
only once someone has reported a violation. The problems with the NLRA 
and other federal mechanisms governing wage discrimination demonstrate 
that the federal scheme as a whole is ineffective and incomprehensible on 
many levels.  
E. Problems in the Law 
Although the current federal legal regimes may have initially been 
successful at bridging the gender wage gap, progress in eliminating gender 
wage inequality in recent years has slowed, leading to stagnation over the 
past decade.162 The current laws are riddled with inconsistencies and 
ambiguities, making it difficult for a woman to discover discrimination 
and successfully recover for any harm she has experienced. Change in the 
laws—making them more harmonized, efficient, and understandable—is 
necessary to work towards eliminating the gender wage gap for good.   
                                                                                                             
§ 157. Federal courts and the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) have 
held that discussing wages in a concerted effort to improve them is a protected 
activity under the NLRA. WOMEN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, PAY 
SECRECY 1 (2014).  
 158. Brian P. O’Neill, Comment, Pay Confidentiality: A Remaining Obstacle 
to Equal Pay After Ledbetter, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1217, 1247 (2010). The 
law covers most private-sector employees, but excludes public-sector employees 
and supervisors. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (defining “employee”). 
 159. This is likely because the NLRA is, “as Professor William R. Corbett has 
noted, ‘one of the best-kept secrets’ of employment law.” Bierman & Gely, supra 
note 157, at 190 (citing William R. Corbett, Waiting for the Labor Law of the 
Twenty-First Century: Everything Old is New Again, 23 BERKELEY J. EMPL. & 
LAB. L. 259, 267 (2002)). 
 160. O’Neill, supra note 158, at 1238.  
 161. Id.   
 162. See supra notes 25 and 75 and accompanying text. 




1. The Stagnant Gap  
On a national level, the gender wage gap has not changed significantly 
over the past decade.163 In Louisiana, the gender wage gap has fluctuated 
within a small range, never dropping under 30%.164 As a 1997 report 
articulated, “[r]ecent increases in the female-to-male earnings ratio have 
been due more to declines in the earnings of men than to increases in the 
earnings of women.”165 The report also stated that women’s earnings have 
remained stagnant since 1990 and men’s real earnings have actually 
dropped by 3.3%.166 Even though the gender wage gap persists, “Congress 
has failed to acknowledge that the Equal Pay Act is ineffective for women 
to prevail on wage discrimination claims, and Congress will not take the 
affirmative action to resolve the current wage inequity between men and 
women.”167 This failure is equally true for Louisiana’s legislators, who 
failed to pass a legislative solution that would have extended additional 
equal pay protections to public and private employees—both women and 
men—in the state of Louisiana.168 
2. Ambiguities in the Laws 
Claims under the Equal Pay Act and Title VII contain several differences. 
For instance, the Equal Pay Act is a strict liability statute, meaning no showing 
of discriminatory intent is necessary.169 Conversely, a claim for disparate 
treatment under Title VII requires a showing of discriminatory intent.170 
Another difference is that a Title VII plaintiff will bear the burden of 
                                                                                                             
 163. See supra note 25.  
 164. See supra note 75. 
 165. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MONEY INCOME IN 
THE UNITED STATES: 1996, at ix (1997) [hereinafter MONEY INCOME IN THE 
UNITED STATES]. See also IDA L. CASTRO, WOMEN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF 
LABOR, EQUAL PAY: A THIRTY-FIVE YEAR PERSPECTIVE 30 (1998). Women’s 
earnings increased approximately 71% between 1960 and 2011, although men’s 
earnings increased at a slower rate of three percent during the same period. NAT’L 
EQUAL PAY TASK FORCE, supra note 33. 
 166. CASTRO, supra note 165, at 30. See also MONEY INCOME IN THE UNITED 
STATES, supra note 165, at ix. 
 167. Lerum, supra note 91, at 223. 
 168. S.B. 219, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2015). See also Hearing on S.B. 219 
Before the H. Comm. on Labor & Indus. Relations, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2015). 
 169. LARSON, supra note 108, § 107.07, at 107-41 n.3. See also MAUREEN F. 
MOORE, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT IN LOUISIANA: A GUIDE TO EMPLOYMENT 
LAWS, REGULATIONS & PRACTICES § 7-5 (2d ed. 2016) (1992). 
 170. Avery, supra note 127, at 875. 




persuasion throughout the claim, while an Equal Pay Act plaintiff will be 
relieved of the burden after a prima facie case of discrimination is 
shown.171 Furthermore, a Title VII defendant must only articulate an 
affirmative defense, while an Equal Pay Act defendant must prove an 
affirmative defense.172  
However, due to the federal circuits’ interpretation of Equal Pay Act 
and Title VII claims, the federal statutory regime is confusing. This 
confusion and ambiguity from varying interpretations of the Equal Pay Act 
and Title VII make claims under both statutory regimes difficult for a 
plaintiff, as her burden of proof will change depending on which claim is 
evaluated and in which federal circuit.173 This confusion and ambiguity 
also make the fact finder’s mission difficult because of the differing burden 
of proof standards. Additionally, what evidence will withstand the burden 
of proof is drastically different depending on the circuit in which the claim 
is brought. One federal judge described the relation between the laws as “a 
complex area of law, suffused with legislative and judicial uncertainty.”174 
Courts have exacerbated this complexity by failing to draw a clear line 
between the burdens of proof for gender wage discrimination claims.175 
Ambiguity also exists with regard to the affirmative defenses afforded to 
employers, particularly the fourth affirmative defense under the Equal Pay 
Act, commonly referred to as the “catch-all” category, as the category can 
include any number of reasons as long as it is deemed justifiable by a 
court.176 
The LLFPA was enacted to aid employees who experienced discrimination 
by giving the employee a broader timeframe in which to file a discrimination 
claim.177 However, the law ignores the reality of wage discrimination 
because a woman may have no idea how her pay compares to her 
coworker’s pay.178 Thus, the LLFPA has been criticized for failing to 
codify the discovery rule, which states that the statute of limitations period 
                                                                                                             
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. See discussion supra Part II.A–B. 
 174. Avery, supra note 127, at 852. 
 175. Goldstein, supra note 127, at 298. See also LARSON, supra note 108, § 
110.02.  
 176. See LARSON, supra note 108, §§ 107.14, 110.02. 
 177. Siniscalco, supra note 153, at 1.  
 178. Nancy Zisk, Lilly Ledbetter, Take Two: The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act 
of 2009 and the Discovery Rule’s Place in the Pay Discrimination Puzzle, 16 WM. 
& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 8 (2009). 




does not begin to run until a plaintiff knows or should have known of the 
discriminatory practice.179  
3. The Discovery Issue in Gender Discrimination  
One of the most glaring issues in both the national and state statutory 
regimes is that employees who have suffered discrimination have no way to 
discover the unlawful employment practices to which they have been 
subjected. Although the LLFPA was designed to extend the time for an 
aggrieved employee to file a pay discrimination claim, it did nothing to 
address the issue of discovering such unlawful employment practices.180 
Justice Ginsberg’s Ledbetter dissent noted, “[c]ompensation disparities . . . 
are often hidden from sight. It is not unusual . . . for management to decline 
to publish employee pay levels, or for employees to keep private their own 
salaries.”181 By not incorporating the discovery rule in the LLFPA, an 
employer could avoid liability simply because an employee was not aware an 
unlawful employment practice occurred.182 This area is one in which a 
legislative measure is appropriate. By incorporating a discovery rule into its 
new equal pay protections, Louisiana would afford all its employees more 
rights than the current federal legislative scheme grants.  
Some scholars suggest that a more expansive prohibition on the 
promulgation of PSC rules may also be in order.183 Going against the 
prevailing social norm of pay secrecy, several proposals in the United 
States seem to make PSC rules “per se illegal.”184 This solution would 
allow employees to openly discuss wages and salaries without fear of 
retaliation or other disciplinary measures by an employer and would aid in 
the discovery of wage discrimination. 
                                                                                                             
 179. Sarah Lyons, Why the Law Should Intervene to Disrupt Pay Secrecy-
Norms: Analyzing the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act Through the Lens of Social 
Norms, 46 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 361, 378 (2012). 
 180. See Kulow, supra note 11, at 386 n.8. 
 181. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 649–50 (2007) 
(Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
 182. Zisk, supra note 178, at 23–25. However, Louisiana already uses the 
discovery rule in many aspects of the law and defendants still have a defense when 
a plaintiff brings a stale claim. See generally LA. CIV. CODE arts. 189, 2534 (2016).  
 183. Bierman & Gely, supra note 157, at 187. 
 184. Id. “Per se illegal” means the act is inherently illegal and no proof of 
surrounding circumstances is needed. See, e.g., Wage Awareness Protection Act, 
S. 2966, 106th Cong. (2002); Fair Pay Act, S. 684, 107th Cong. § 4(7) (2001); 
CAL. LAB. CODE § 232 (2002).  




Additionally, many employees are unaware that they have rights under 
the NLRA, and “[p]revailing social norms are such that even fully knowing 
his or her rights under the NLRA, the vast majority of employees are still 
highly unlikely to bring charges regarding this matter to the NLRB.”185 As 
there is not a driving force behind the rules, pushing employees to bring 
claims, the NLRA is not policing the area of pay secrecy as well as it should 
be. The NLRA also does not cover employees classified as supervisors, 
meaning that an entire class of employees could be subject to PSC rules as 
a condition of employment.186 Therefore, simply by classifying an 
employee’s position as supervisory, an employer could legally escape the 
federal prohibition on PSC rules. The courts and the NLRB are also split on 
the definition of supervisor,187 meaning an employee could or could not be 
covered under the NLRA depending on his or her job classification. This 
disagreement allows employers another way to escape federal regulations 
on PSC rules. By including supervisors under PSC rule prohibitions in 
Louisiana, there would be no such ambiguity. These problems in federal law 
mirror some issues in Louisiana law, all of which need to be remedied to 
finally bridge gender wage inequality.  
III. LOUISIANA’S EQUAL PAY REGIME AND ITS PROBLEMS 
In the past decade, progress in eliminating the gender wage gap has 
slowed and eventually stagnated.188 The current laws are peppered with 
inconsistencies and ambiguities, making it difficult for a woman to 
discover discrimination and successfully recover for any harm she has 
experienced. In addition to federal protective measures, Louisiana 
currently has two statutory regimes governing gender discrimination.189 
The first is the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law,190 which 
governs all employees in the state. The second statutory regime is the 
Louisiana Equal Pay for Women Act,191 which applies only to women who 
work in public service for the state. The law covers women in public 
positions and grants more protections than the law applicable to all 
Louisiana employees.  
                                                                                                             
 185. Bierman & Gely, supra note 157, at 190. 
 186. GERALD MAYER & JON. O SHIMABUKURO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL34350, THE DEFINITION OF “SUPERVISOR” UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR 
RELATIONS ACT 1 (2012).  
 187. Id. 
 188. See supra notes 25 and 75.  
 189. See generally LA. REV. STAT. §§ 23:662, 23:332 (2016). 
 190. 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1409 (West). 
 191. 2013 La. Sess. Law Serv. 374 (West). 




A. The Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law 
The Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law is largely co-
extensive with federal prohibitions.192 The law “prohibits intentional 
discrimination in employment because of . . . sex,”193 and the law applies 
to public and private employers, employment agencies, and labor 
unions.194 Under this law it is an unlawful employment practice to 
“[i]ntentionally pay wages to an employee at a rate less than that of another 
employee of the opposite sex for equal work on jobs in which their 
performance requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility and which are 
performed under similar working conditions.”195 This language is almost 
identical to the language in the Equal Pay Act.196 
The definition of employer under Louisiana law, however, is narrower 
than under Title VII.197 The Louisiana definition states that an employer 
                                                                                                             
 192. MOORE, supra note 169, § 7-2. 
 193. Id. The law also applies to discrimination based on race, color, religion, 
national origin, age, disability, or an individual’s sickle-cell trait. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:332(A)(3) (2016). 
 196. Compare id. § 23:332(A)(3) (it is an unlawful employment practice to 
“[i]ntentionally pay wages to an employee at a rate less than that of another 
employee of the opposite sex for equal work on jobs in which their performance 
requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility and which are performed under 
similar working conditions”), with 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012) (“No employer 
having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall discriminate, 
within any establishment in which such employees are employed, between 
employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such 
establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of 
the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of 
which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed 
under similar working conditions . . . .”).  
 197. Compare LA. REV. STAT. § 23:302(2) (“‘Employer’ means a person, 
association, legal or commercial entity, the state, or any state agency, board, 
commission, or political subdivision of the state receiving services from an 
employee and, in return, giving compensation of any kind to an employee. The 
provisions of this Chapter shall apply only to an employer who employs twenty 
or more employees within this state for each working day in each of twenty or 
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year. ‘Employer’ shall 
also include an insurer, as defined in R.S. 22:46, with respect to appointment of 
agents, regardless of the character of the agent’s employment.”), with 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e(b) (“The term ‘employer’ means a person engaged in an industry 
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in 
each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, 
and any agent of such a person, but such term does not include (1) the United 




must employ 20 or more employees within the state for each working day 
in 20 or more calendar weeks of the current or previous calendar year.198 The 
statute also requires that an employer receive services from the employee, 
who is in turn compensated.199 Because Louisiana law covers fewer 
employers than national law, there is another contributing factor to gender 
wage inequality in play.  
The variety of affirmative defenses available to employers also 
contributes to the inequality. Under the law, it is not an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer to compensate employees differently because of a 
bona fide seniority or merit system.200 Additionally, a system that measures 
compensation by quantity or quality of production is allowed.201 The law also 
includes the same “catch-all” defense provided in the Equal Pay Act.202 
Finally, an employer may pay different rates of compensation to employees 
who work in different locations.203 Louisiana’s affirmative defenses are all 
very similar to the federal provisions, which also have done little to bridge the 
national gender wage gap. 
Louisiana’s law does have a unique feature from federal law, which may 
help to bridge gender wage inequality long term. Under the Louisiana 
Employment Discrimination Law, an employee may file a discrimination 
charge with a local commission or the Louisiana Commission on Human 
Rights (“LCHR”) within 180 days of the unlawful employment practice.204 
The plaintiff may also file a claim of discrimination with the EEOC within 
300 days of the unlawful employment practice or within 30 days after the 
                                                                                                             
States, a corporation wholly owned by the Government of the United States, an 
Indian tribe, or any department or agency of the District of Columbia subject by 
statute to procedures of the competitive service (as defined in section 2102 of title 
5), or (2) a bona fide private membership club (other than a labor organization) 
which is exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of title 26, except that during 
the first year after March 24, 1972, persons having fewer than twenty-five 
employees (and their agents) shall not be considered employers.”). 
 198. MOORE, supra note 169. The definition of employer under Title VII is “a 
person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more 
employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the 
current or preceding year.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Louisiana law does not require 
that an employer be in an industry “affecting commerce.” LA. REV. STAT. § 
23:302(2).  
 199. MOORE, supra note 169, § 7-2. 
 200. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:332(H)(3). 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id.  
 203. Id. This provision incorporates the final affirmative defense available 
under Title VII. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 204. MOORE, supra note 169. 




LCHR makes its final decision.205 A third option allows a plaintiff to file 
a claim in a district court or in a federal district court where the alleged 
unlawful employment practice occurred within 90 days of receiving an 
EEOC right-to-sue letter.206 There is no requirement that an employee 
exhaust all administrative remedies before filing suit.207 However, the law 
does require a plaintiff intending to file a claim of discrimination to 
provide the employer with written notice at least 30 days prior to any court 
action, and it requires both parties make a good-faith effort to resolve the 
dispute prior to any court action.208 The law also includes an anti-
retaliation provision, but only for age discrimination and sickle-cell trait 
discrimination.209 Therefore, there is no cause of action for retaliation in 
employment suits based on gender discrimination, an issue the law needs 
to address. This provision of Louisiana law is different from federal law 
and is one way Louisiana law is more progressive and employee-friendly 
than federal provisions. This law still gives private employees less 
protection than public employees, however, because their wages have an 
additional layer of protection under Louisiana law.  
B. The Louisiana Equal Pay for Women Act  
The Louisiana Equal Pay for Women Act supplements the Louisiana 
Employment Discrimination Law, providing additional protections to 
Louisiana women in public service.210 The Louisiana Equal Pay for 
Women Act covers female employees who work 40 or more hours a week 
for a department, subdivision, agency, commission, board, or committee 
of the state.211 The law prohibits an employer from paying one sex less 
than another in the same agency for work that is the same or is substantially 
similar.212 The jobs must require equal skill, effort, education, and 
responsibility and must be performed under similar working conditions.213 
This law combines the prohibitions under the Equal Pay Act and Title VII, 
but adds a condition that the jobs require equal education.214 This 
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 212. Id. § 23:664(A). 
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 214. See discussion supra Part II.A–B. 




additional requirement would make a claim even more difficult to prove 
for an employee who has been discriminated against.  
Even though the law makes it more difficult for an employee who has 
experienced discrimination to bring a claim against an employer, the law 
does provide some additional benefits. For example, an employer cannot 
reduce the salary of one worker to meet that of another to comply with the 
statute.215 Further, the Louisiana Equal Pay for Women Act also contains 
a no-retaliation provision, under which an employer cannot discipline or 
otherwise discriminate against employees who choose to disclose their 
wages, discusses their wages with another employee, or file a claim for a 
violation of the law.216 An employee who successfully alleges and proves 
discriminatory practices by an employer is entitled to unpaid wages, 
reasonable attorney’s fees, and court costs.217 However, the unpaid wages 
are limited to 36 months before written notice to the employer.218  
Similar to the federal legislative regimes, an employer can escape 
liability for discrimination by proving one of the four affirmative defenses 
justifies any difference in wages paid to a woman who holds the same 
                                                                                                             
 215. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:664(C). 
 216. Id. The law states,  
D. It shall be unlawful for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny 
the exercise of, or attempt to exercise, any right provided under this 
Chapter. It shall be unlawful for any employer to discriminate, retaliate, 
or take any adverse employment action, including but not limited to 
termination or in any other manner discriminate against any employee 
for inquiring about, disclosing, comparing, or otherwise discussing the 
employee’s wages or the wages of any other employee, or aiding or 
encouraging any other employee to exercise his or her rights under this 
Chapter. 
E. It shall be unlawful for an employer subject to this Chapter to 
discriminate, retaliate, or take any adverse employment action, including 
but not limited to termination against an employee because, in exercising 
or attempting to exercise the employee’s rights under this Chapter, such 
employee: (1) Has filed any complaint or has instituted or caused to be 
instituted any proceeding to enforce the employee’s rights under this 
Chapter. (2) Has provided or will provide any information in connection 
with any inquiry or proceeding relating to any right afforded to an 
employee pursuant to this Chapter. (3) Has testified or will testify in any 
inquiry or proceeding relating to any right afforded to an employee 
pursuant to this Chapter. 
Id. 
 217. Id. § 23:666(A). 
 218. Id. § 23:666(B). This time period is longer than the federal provisions 
provide. See supra notes 130 and 148 and accompanying text.  




position as a man.219 Unlike the federal system, however, these defenses 
have additional conditions attached.220 These conditions include that the 
defense must be related to the job at issue and the employer must show 
there exists no alternative employment practice that would serve a 
“legitimate business purpose” without producing a wage differential.221 
The four affirmative defenses are available when pay is based on a 
seniority system, a merit system, an incentive system, or any wage 
differential based on a “bona fide factor other than sex.”222 The fourth 
affirmative defense, generally referred to as a “catch-all” category, would 
include factors such as education, experience, and training, among other 
bona fide factors.223 These additional conditions attached to employer 
affirmative defenses can make it more difficult to show that the pay 
difference between a female and male worker is justified. 
The law also provides more protection to employees in Louisiana and 
differs from the federal scheme in that the statute of limitations is one year 
from when the employee knew or should have known that the employer 
was in violation of the chapter,224 as the federal law does not incorporate 
the discovery doctrine.225 The inclusion of the discovery doctrine is one 
way in which the state law favors an employee who has experienced 
discrimination. The Louisiana Equal Pay for Women Act is restricted to 
public employers in the state of Louisiana, but it gives an employee several 
avenues to seek remedies.226 First, an employee may lodge a formal 
complaint with the employer, who will then have 60 days to investigate 
and respond.227 After the employer has completed its investigation and if 
                                                                                                             
 219.  LA. REV. STAT. § 23:664(B). 
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 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. § 23:666(B)(4).  
 224. See id. § 23:667. 
 225. The discovery doctrine states that the statute of limitations does not begin 
to run until an employee discovers or should have discovered the unlawful 
employment practice. Ronald Turner, Pliable Precedents, Plausible Policies, and 
Lilly Ledbetter, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 336, 367 (2009).  
 226. See infra notes 227–30 and accompanying text. 
 227. MOORE, supra note 169, § 7-5. The law states,  
An employee who in good faith believes that her employer is in violation 
of this Chapter shall submit written notice of the alleged violation to the 
employer. An employer who receives such written notice from an 
employee shall have sixty days from receipt of the notice to investigate 
the matter and remedy any violation of this Chapter. If an employer 
remedies the violation in a manner that complies with the statute and 
within the time provided herein, the employee may not bring any action 




a solution satisfactory to the employee has not been made, the employee 
can submit a complaint to the LCHR.228 The LCHR will perform its own 
investigation and either issue a finding of discriminatory practices or will 
find there was no discrimination.229 If no discrimination was found, the 
employee will still have the right to file a lawsuit, but only in the 19th 
Judicial District Court.230 This law provides only one of many ways a 
Louisiana employee can bring a wage discrimination claim against her 
employer. 
C. Procedural Recovery Mechanisms for Louisiana Employees 
Public employees in Louisiana can bring a claim under the Equal Pay 
Act, Title VII of the CRA, the Louisiana Employment Discrimination 
Law, or the Louisiana Equal Pay for Women Act.231 Private employees in 
Louisiana can bring a claim under all of these laws except the Louisiana 
Equal Pay for Women Act.232 The current scheme affords Louisiana public 
employees more rights than are offered to private employees in the state. 
Additionally, the laws and remedies available to all women in Louisiana 
and in the rest of the states are scattered in many different provisions.233 In 
many cases, as under the federal regime, employees are not even aware of 
                                                                                                             
against the employer pursuant to this Chapter except as provided in 
Subsections B and C of this Section. 
LA. REV. STAT. § 23:665(A). 
 228. MOORE, supra note 169, § 7-5. The law states, “If an employer fails to resolve 
the dispute to the satisfaction of such employee within the time provided herein, the 
employee may file a complaint with the commission requesting an investigation of the 
complaint pursuant to R.S. 51:2257.” LA. REV. STAT. § 23:665(B). 
 229. MOORE, supra note 169, § 7-5. The law states,  
If the commission finds evidence of discriminatory, retaliatory or other 
adverse employment action on the part of the employer in violation of 
this Chapter but is unable to resolve or mediate the dispute, or fails to 
render a decision as to the dispute, or issues a finding of no 
discrimination on the part of the employer, the employee may institute a 
civil suit in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court.  
LA. REV. STAT. § 23:665(C). 
 230. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:665(C).  
 231. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012); Fair Labor Standards Act, 
29 U.S.C. § 201 (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012); Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012); LA. REV. STAT. §§ 23:303, 23:332, 23:665. 
 232. 29 U.S.C. § 206; 29 U.S.C. § 201; 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; 
LA. REV. STAT. §§ 23:303, 23:332. 
 233. See 29 U.S.C. § 206; 29 U.S.C. § 201; 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e; LA. REV. STAT. §§ 23:303, 23:332. 




the rights and remedies available when they have experienced 
discrimination.234 Women have moved in increasing numbers into the state 
and national workforce, and families have increasingly come to rely on 
women and their income for survival.235 This problem necessitates a 
legislative regime under which all rights and remedies available for a 
violation are located in one place so that women, men, and future 
generations are treated both fairly and equally, and all have a chance at not 
only survival, but success. This reform would result in more efficiency and 
equity for all workers in Louisiana, regardless of sex. 
IV. LOUISIANA’S LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION 
In the 2015 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature, Senator Edwin 
R. Murray proposed a bill aimed at expanding additional equal pay protection 
to all Louisiana workers.236 However, the bill was involuntarily deferred by a 
vote in the House Labor and Industrial Relations Committee,237 and the law 
did not make it to the House floor for a vote—it therefore stood no chance of 
continuing through the legislative process and being enacted into state law.238  
A. Louisiana Senate Bill 219 
Louisiana Senate Bill 219 is one example in a series of attempts to 
bridge the wide gap in gender wage inequality that has plagued Louisiana 
for decades.239 The proposed bill applied the protections in the Louisiana 
Equal Pay for Women Act to both public and private employees.240 Senate 
Bill 219 defined “employee” more broadly than the current regime, 
defining an employee as “any individual who works for the employer in 
                                                                                                             
 234. See discussion supra Part II.E.3.  
 235. See discussion supra Parts I.A.5, I.C. 
 236. S.B. 219, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2015).  
 237. Id. (involuntarily deferred in House Committee on Industrial & Labor 
Relations). When an instrument is involuntarily deferred, it may be rescheduled 
for a committee hearing only by a two-thirds vote of the committee members. See 
H.R. 6.9, H.R. 6.10.  
 238. S.B. 219, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2015) (involuntarily deferred in 
House Committee on Industrial & Labor Relations).  
 239. See S.B. 334, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2014) (died in Senate); S.B. 219, 
2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2015); S.B. 254, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2016). This 
Comment was written prior to the 2016 Regular Session of the Louisiana 
Legislature where Senator Morrell proposed an almost identical bill to S.B. 219. 
S.B. 254, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2016). This bill too did not make it to the House 
floor. S.B. 254, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2016) (bill defeated in ten to five vote). 
 240. S.B. 219, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2015). 




return for compensation.”241 The definition of employer was also changed, 
adding to the current definition that “any individual, partnership, corporation, 
association, business, trust, person, contractor, labor organization, or entity for 
whom fifty or more full-time equivalent employees are gainfully employed 
within the state.”242 This change could have made great strides toward 
reducing gender wage inequality by extending rights to both men and women 
in both public and private service. 
Similarly, even though employers were allowed four affirmative 
defenses, which were very similar to those under the Equal Pay Act, they were 
slightly more restrictive, meaning both women and men could have been more 
likely to allege and prove gender wage discrimination.243 The proposed law 
would have changed the current legislative regime, Louisiana Revised 
Statutes section 23:301 and the following, by adding that the fourth 
affirmative defense must be a bona fide factor, other than sex, that is 
consistent with a business necessity.244 Unlike the Equal Pay Act and Title 
VII, this provision would cover both intentional discrimination and 
unintentional discrimination.245 These additional restrictions could have 
made it more difficult for an employer to justify a difference in wages 
between men and women. The restrictions also could have made it less 
likely an employer would want to take the risk of paying different wages 
to workers of different sexes, thus risking a suit against an employee that 
the employer may not win. 
Employees who believe there has been a violation of the statutory 
regime must first make a complaint to their employers, and the employer 
has 60 days to investigate and remedy any discriminatory differential in 
pay.246 If the employer remedies the discrimination to the satisfaction of 
the aggrieved employee, the employee can no longer bring an action 
regarding a violation of the statute.247 However, if the employer fails to 
                                                                                                             
 241. Id. The current law defines and employee as any female who is employed 
for 40 or more hours a week. Id. Therefore, the bill would also extend equal pay 
protections to part-time workers in the state. Id. 
 242. Id. This provision changes the law from applying only to the state or one 
of its political subdivisions to all employers, both public and private, within the 
state that have 50 or more employees. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. This is different from a “bona fide factor other than sex” exception in 
the current law. 
 245. Id. The Equal Pay Act does not require the discrimination to be intentional, 
although Title VII applies to circumstances in which the discrimination is intentional. 
See supra notes 169–70 and accompanying text.  
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 




resolve the complaint, the employee can file a complaint with LCHR.248 If 
the Commission finds no violations within 180 days from the filing of the 
complaint, or if the LCHR issues a finding of no discrimination, the 
employee can institute a civil suit in any district court within the state.249 
This system allows more employees to file discrimination claims in the 
state because the employee is no longer required to file suit in the 19th 
Judicial District Court.250 An employee must bring the wage 
discrimination claim in a district court within one year of the date an 
employee is aware or should have been aware that the employer was in 
violation of the provisions.251 This procedural mechanism for recovery 
appears to be more straightforward and efficient than the federal mechanisms 
for wage discrimination recovery. 
An employer who commits wage discrimination would be liable for 
unpaid wages, attorney’s fees, interest, and costs.252 An employee who 
prevails on a wage discrimination claim may be awarded additional liquidated 
damages up to the amount of any unpaid wages.253 The court also has 
discretion to order the reinstatement of employment, promotion, or 
compensation for lost benefits to the employee who has suffered 
discrimination.254 However, the unpaid wages an employee can receive are 
limited to violations within the past 36 months before the employee sent 
notification of the alleged unlawful employment practice to the employer.255 
Under federal law, an employee may only receive unpaid wages for two 
years before the last unlawful paycheck that the employee received.256 
This difference means that under the proposed bill, Louisiana law would 
afford greater relief to its workers than is afforded under federal law. 
                                                                                                             
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. The federal statutes do not allow an employee to first file a complaint 
with an employer, possibly remedying any discrimination before resorting to 
administrative remedies or adjudication.  
 250. Compare S.B. 219, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2015), with LA. REV. STAT. 
§ 23:665 (2016). 
 251. S.B. 219, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2015). This provision is the 
discovery rule, which was not incorporated into the federal regime with the 
passage of the LLFPA. Thus, if an employee discovers or should have discovered 
an unlawful employment practice and waits more than one year to file a claim for 
discrimination, the claim would be barred by the statute of limitations. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. See 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. 




B. Equal Pay Legislation  
Although Senate Bill 219 was a good proposal to jumpstart the process 
of bridging gender wage inequality in Louisiana, additional changes are 
needed. For example, the proposed bill was more progressive in that it 
eliminated the gender identifier257 in the previous law, which is a step 
forward in breaking down ingrained social norms of separating men and 
women under the law.258 Additionally, the bill kept the discovery rule in 
Louisiana law, meaning the statute of limitations on a discrimination 
action did not begin to run until an employee knew or should have known 
of the discrimination. However, the bill needs improvements to make 
progress in eliminating gender wage inequality. The proposed bill 
classified an employer as a person or entity with 50 or more employees, 
excluding a large number of employers from the bill’s provisions.259 
Louisiana should look to equal pay legislation in other states for guidance 
to devise a system equitable to employees and employers, as well as one 
that would pass in the state legislature. 
1. States with Low Gender Wage Gaps 
Several states with low gender wage gaps, such as Hawaii, Maryland, 
and Florida,260 as well as one state in the middle of the gender wage gap 
calculation—California—have laws showing the changes Louisiana could 
make to bridge the gender wage gap currently plaguing its women 
workers. Similar to Louisiana’s current regime, Hawaii’s law contains two 
separate provisions.261 The first provision applies to all public and private 
                                                                                                             
 257. The Louisiana Equal Pay for Women Act stated, “a woman who performs 
public service for the state is entitled to be paid the same compensation for her 
services as is paid to a man who performs the same kind, grade, and quality of 
service, and a distinction in compensation may not be made because of sex.” LA. 
REV. STAT. § 23:662 (2016). S.B. 210 would have changed this language to “the 
public policy of this state is that all employees shall be compensated equally for 
work that is the same or comparable in kind and quality. No distinction in 
compensation may be made because of sex.” S.B. 219, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 
2015).  
 258. See generally Joseph A. Custer, The Three Waves of Married Women’s 
Property Acts in the Nineteenth Century with a Focus on Mississippi, New York, 
and Oregon, 30 OH. NORTHERN UNIV. L. REV. 395 (2014).  
 259. S.B. 219, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2015).  
 260. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.07 (West 2016); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 378-
1–378-6, 387-1, 387-4–387-8, 387-12 (West 2016); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & 
EMPL. §§ 3-301–3-309 (West 2016). 
 261. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 378-1, 387-1. 




employees, except those who work for the United States government,262 
and the second provision applies only to private employees.263 The laws in 
Maryland, Florida, and California cover both public and private 
employees.264 
a. Similarities in the Provisions  
Hawaii’s, Maryland’s, and Florida’s laws contain several similar 
provisions. First, Hawaii’s law, which applies to all workers, and Florida’s 
law prohibit discrimination in pay between workers of different sexes who 
work in the same establishment; on jobs that require equal skill, effort, and 
responsibility; and who work under similar conditions.265 Second, the 
affirmative defenses allowed to an employer in Hawaii’s law and Florida’s 
law are also similar. The provisions provide employers with certain 
affirmative defenses, including a seniority system, a merit system, a 
system that measures compensation based on quantity or quality of 
production, and a differential based on any other permissible factor other 
than sex.266 Maryland’s law also includes these merit system and seniority 
system affirmative defenses.267 Additionally, Hawaii’s provision, which 
applies only to private employees, includes a seniority system affirmative 
defense.268 These similarities indicate there are some provisions that 
should be in all equal pay legislation. 
b. Differences in the Laws 
Although the laws provide some similar protections and defenses, 
there are also many differences. First, Maryland’s law prohibits 
discrimination in wages for work that is of comparable character or for 
                                                                                                             
 262. Id. § 378-1. 
 263. Id. § 387-1. Thus, Hawaii’s statutory regime appears to be the inverse of 
the system that is currently in effect in Louisiana. 
 264. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.07; MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-302; CAL. 
LAB. CODE §1171 (2016). The law covers employers who have at least two or 
more employees. The law is more radical than the Louisiana law, under which 
only employers with 50 or more employees would be covered. S.B. 219, 2015 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2015).  
 265. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2.3; MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-307. 
 266. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2.3; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.07. Under 
Florida law, the “catch-all” category must be exercised in good faith. FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 448.07(2)(a). 
 267. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-304. This provision gives a list of 
more detailed defenses to employers than other state’s statutory provisions. 
 268. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2.3. 




work that is of the same operation, same business, or same type.269 
Hawaii’s private employee provision prohibits the payment of different 
wages between the sexes.270  
The laws also contain different types of affirmative defenses. For 
example, Hawaii’s first provision, which applies to all workers, includes a 
defense for a bona fide occupational qualification.271 Hawaii’s private 
employee provision and Maryland’s law contain different affirmative 
defenses. Hawaii’s law allows the payment of different wages based on 
length of service, differences in duty or service, differences in shift or time 
of day of work, or differences in hours of work.272 An employer’s 
affirmative defenses under Maryland’s law include jobs that require 
different abilities or skills, jobs that require regular performance of 
different duties or services, and work that is performed on different shifts 
or at different times of day.273  
A successful plaintiff under any law may recover unpaid wages, but 
an employer’s liability for the wages differs under each provision.274 
Hawaii’s provision, covering all employees, allows back pay, attorney’s 
fees, and other fees for two years before the filing of the claim.275 Hawaii’s 
private employee provision provides for unpaid wages and overtime, with 
no apparent time limit, and allows for liquidated damages if the violation 
is willful.276 Maryland’s law allows the recovery of the difference in wages 
between male and female workers, as well as any liquidated damages.277 
A successful plaintiff in Florida may recover back pay for one year before 
the filing of the claim.278 
The statute of limitations period also differs under each law. A claim 
under Hawaii’s provisions must be filed within two years of the unlawful 
employment conduct.279 Maryland’s law provides for a three-year statute 
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 270. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 387-4. This law does not contain the requirement 
that the workers be in the same establishment or that the jobs require equal skill, 
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 271. Id. § 378-2.3. 
 272. Id. § 387-4. These affirmative defenses are different from both Hawaii’s 
other provision and the federal Equal Pay Act. 
 273. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-304. This provision gives a list of 
more detailed defenses to employers than other state’s statutory provisions. 
 274. See infra notes 275–78.  
 275. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-5. 
 276. Id. § 387-12. 
 277. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-307. 
 278. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.07 (West 2016). The proposed Louisiana law 
allows for the recovery of three years of back pay. 
 279. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 378-5, 381-12. 




of limitations period,280 while Florida’s statute of limitations is six months 
after the worker’s employment has been terminated.281 Maryland’s law 
also prohibits an employer from retaliating when an employee makes a 
complaint, brings an action, or testifies in the action of a fellow 
employee.282 The differences in the laws show that the provisions can be 
tailored differently to each state but still be strict and effective at 
eliminating gender wage inequality. 
c. California  
California, which is in the middle of the gender wage gap ranking,283 
recently passed an equal pay bill that some call the toughest in the 
nation.284 The bill is an attempt to eliminate the average 16-cent wage gap 
plaguing the state, as it prohibits the payment of different compensation 
between the sexes for work of substantially similar character that requires 
similar skill, effort, and responsibilities.285 However, the law has several 
differences from federal law and provisions in other states. For instance, 
the bill eliminates the requirement that a wage differential be in the same 
establishment.286 The law also provides an employer similar affirmative 
defenses to federal law, but these defenses, particularly the one based on 
any factor other than sex, must be related to the job and must be consistent 
with a business necessity.287 Additionally, the defenses an employer relies 
                                                                                                             
 280. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-307.  
 281. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.07. The law does not incorporate the discovery 
rule, however, but the statute of limitations starts running after the employee is no 
longer employed. 
 282. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-308. 
 283. THE SIMPLE TRUTH, supra note 4, at 7. 
 284. Patrick McGreevy & Chris Megerian, California Now Has One of the 
Toughest Equal Pay Laws in the Country, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2015), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-me-pc-gov-brown-equal-pay-bill-2015100 
6-story.html [https://perma.cc/W7XE-UW6T].  
 285. S.B. 358, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2015). The wage gap among Latina 
women in California is the largest in the nation at 44 cents per male dollar. Id. 
The bill is different from other states’ laws because the skill, effort, and 
responsibilities of the jobs do not have to be equal, but merely similar. Id. This 
difference would allow more flexibility in job comparison.  
 286. Id. The Equal Pay Act and several other states require that a female 
worker and her male comparator work in the same establishment. See discussion 
supra Part II.A, Part IV.B.1.a–b. 
 287. S.B. 358, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2015). 




on must account for the entire wage differential between a woman and her 
male co-worker.288 
An employee may institute an action for a violation of the law within two 
years of the cause of action occurring or within three years if the violation was 
willful.289 An employee who successfully alleges and proves wage 
discrimination is owed all wage and interest of which she was deprived 
because of the discrimination, as well as an equal amount in liquidated 
damages.290 The law also prohibits discrimination or retaliation if employees 
disclose their wages, discuss their wages, or inquire about another employee’s 
wages.291 The statute of limitations on this action is one year after the cause 
of action occurs.292 As the law took effect January 1, 2016, data about how 
the provisions have affected gender wage disparity in California does not exist 
yet. However, before the law was passed women working full-time in 
California lost more than $33 billion each year because of the gender wage 
gap.293 However, the law has caused employers to reevaluate what it means 
for a job to be substantially similar, to reconsider how the employer classifies 
its employees, and to reexamine payroll to discover disparities.294 Proponents 
hope these stricter provisions will help to bridge the remaining gender wage 
gap in California.295 California’s law shows that change is necessary to drive 
progress of the gender wage gap forward. 
2. Proposed Equal Pay Modifications in Louisiana  
By looking at the successes and failures of provisions in other states, 
Louisiana can modify its law to achieve the best results. First, Louisiana 
should expand all equal pay measures to cover both public and private 
employees, giving all workers in the state the same protections. Most of the 
provisions in other states cover employers with at least one or more 
                                                                                                             
 288. Id. Under other provisions, the defense could apply to only part of the 
wage difference, meaning an employer could claim all the affirmative defenses 
accounted for the wage differential. Under California law, however, the employer 
must articulate one affirmative defense that accounts for the entire wage 
difference. Id. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. The law does not appear to contain a temporal limit on an employer’s 
liability for back wages. 
 291. Id. 
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 293. S.B. 358, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2015). 
 294. Lauren Weber, For Bosses in California, A Tough New Fair Pay Law, WALL 
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employees.296 However, Louisiana could still afford protection to its small 
businesses297 by increasing this number, making a compromise between the 
interests of workers and businesses.298 Louisiana could also adopt California’s 
method and grant protections to jobs with similar—but not equal—skill, 
effort, and responsibility. This provision would make it easier for courts to 
compare a female’s job to a higher-paid male.  
Louisiana should also revise the affirmative defenses available to 
employers. A more detailed provision of the affirmative defenses available to 
an employer, such as the laws in California, Maryland, or Hawaii, would be 
beneficial. California’s affirmative defenses are the strictest of all, but this 
type of measure is needed to bridge the wage gap in Louisiana. When the 
average difference in men and women’s wage in Louisiana is 35 cents, drastic 
action is needed. By making a justification for gender wage inequality harder 
for an employer to claim, Louisiana can finally begin moving towards the 
elimination of gender wage disparity. Of all the laws evaluated, Louisiana 
currently allows the most expansive recovery of unpaid wages at three years 
of back wages.299 However, several states do not contain a temporal limit on 
recovery. In this way, Louisiana’s proposal of three years of back-wages 
recovery is a compromise from other successful laws, as the unpaid wages 
liability of the employer balances interests while still providing a Louisiana 
woman with more protection than federal law provides. Louisiana’s 
incorporation of the discovery rule should remain in the law300 because it 
affords a protection to employees who have been discriminated against, but 
who are unable to discover such discrimination. With these modifications, 
                                                                                                             
 296. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.07(b) (West 2016); HAW. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 378-1, 387-1 (West 2016); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-301(b) 
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2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2015). 
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employee as an entity with 25 or more employees as was originally proposed in 
the bill.  
 299. Compare LA. REV. STAT. § 23:661 (2016), with FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
448.07(3); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 378-5(b), 387-12; MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & 
EMPL. § 3-307; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 34-06.1-05; W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 21-
5B-4, 21-5E-4 CAL. LAB. CODE §1197.5(b) (2016). 
 300. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:667. 




Louisiana’s law would afford additional protections to women who work in 
the private sector and would indicate a significant effort to eliminate gender 
wage inequality. The compromises are also likely to help the bill pass through 
the Louisiana Legislature, thereby affording all workers protection and the 
ability to discover and enforce their rights when discrimination occurs, but 
balance those interests against the employer’s business interests. 
C. No-Retaliation Provisions, Pay Secrecy, and Confidentiality Rules  
One of the most glaring difficulties in wage discrimination cases is how 
an employee actually discovers she has experienced discrimination. One 
solution would be to incorporate a prohibition on PSC rules into state law.301 
Currently, the NLRA prohibits employers from making it a condition of 
employment that employees not discuss their wages with other employees.302 
The practice of wage secrecy is in line with prevailing social norms in the 
United States,303 but it is a significant impediment to eradicating wage 
discrimination. An exception to PSC prohibitions allows employers to limit 
discussion of wages during business hours because a legitimate business 
reason exists in promoting and maintaining workplace efficiency.304  
Several states currently have laws prohibiting PSC rules.305 The remedies 
available under violations of these statutes vary,306 and the laws are likely 
preempted concerning general employees, but they are good law as applied to 
employees classified as supervisors.307 Louisiana law currently does not cover 
anti-retaliation in wage discrimination claims, however, as the protection 
extends only to sickle-cell and age discrimination cases.308 Therefore, a 
solution that extends this protection to all Louisiana workers is necessary. 
The Louisiana Equal Pay for Women Act currently prohibits retaliation 
or any other action by an employer against an employee who inquires about, 
discloses, or discusses wages or salary,309 but this law applies only to public 
employees. Additionally, the law does not bar an employer from prohibiting 
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the disclosure of wages as condition of employment.310 The law also does not 
prohibit an employer from requiring an employee to sign a waiver or any other 
document prohibiting the disclosure of wages.311 A new statutory regime must 
include these types of protections. 
Looking at how other states formulate PSC laws may help Louisiana 
create a law that is beneficial to both employees and employers and that could 
pass through the Louisiana Legislature. Currently, 10 states and the District 
of Columbia have prohibitions on PSC rules.312 Most of the laws have similar 
prohibitions. First, an employer cannot prohibit employees from disclosing 
their wages or discussing wages with another employee.313 Second, an 
employer cannot require employees to waive their rights or sign a document 
as a condition of employment prohibiting them from discussing or 
disclosing wages.314 Finally, an employer cannot discharge, discipline, or 
otherwise discriminate against employees who voluntarily disclose their 
wages.315 
Although the laws all seem to have similar requirements, Louisiana could 
make its provisions more progressive. First, Louisiana should extend PSC rule 
prohibitions to gender wage discrimination claims so that a female employee 
may bring an action for any discrimination or retaliation experienced because 
she disclosed or discussed her wages. Second, the prohibition should be clear 
that the definition of “employee” covers both non-supervisory and 
supervisory employees, thereby extending protection beyond what the NLRA 
grants. Finally, Louisiana should be clear that all three forms of PSC rules 
prohibitions are covered. These changes would provide protections to all 
employees, but still allow employers to limit discussion or other employee 
action during certain times—such as during business hours—to promote 
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workplace efficiency. As with equal pay provisions, this law would strike a 
balance between protecting both employees’ rights and employers’ businesses.  
CONCLUSION 
Employees in Louisiana should have a statutory regime that is free of 
inefficiencies and ambiguities, as well as one that gives equal rights and 
protections to all employees. As Governor John Bel Edwards advised in his 
inauguration speech, the Louisiana Legislature “should finally pass effective 
equal pay so that women, the economic leaders of many households, get the 
same pay for the same work.”316 Accordingly, Senate Bill 219 should be passed 
with certain modifications, extending equal pay protections to all employees in 
Louisiana, both public and private. First, the equal pay protections should 
include jobs with similar—but not equal—skill, effort, and responsibility, 
making comparison between a female and male easier. Second, the bill should 
revise and make stricter the affirmative defenses afforded to employers. Third, 
the bill should extend no-retaliation provisions to all employees, particularly if 
employees choose to discuss or disclose their wages, bring an action for 
employment discrimination, or aid other employees in their cases of 
discrimination. Finally, the statutory regime should be modified to include an 
explicit ban on PSC rules and forbid Louisiana employers from making it a 
condition of employment that employees must not disclose or discuss their 
wages. This addition should also expand the definition of an employee in 
Louisiana law to include those employees classified as supervisors. To reach 
gender wage equity, all workers must have equal protections under the law. 
When approximately 40% of United States women are their family’s primary 
breadwinners and the gender wage gap in Louisiana is 35%, justice requires 
granting equal pay to all workers and establishing an efficient mechanism to 
enforce all workers’ rights. Louisiana can accomplish this task by granting 
equal rights to all employees and establishing an efficient mechanism for the 
enforcement of those rights. 
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